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Catching Up and Lagging Behind in a Balance-of-Payments-
Constrained Dual Economy* 
 
Alejandro LavopaÖ 
June 2014 
 
Abstract 
The success of nations in the path towards economic development hinges heavily on the emergence and 
dynamism of a modern sector capable of simultaneously absorbing an increasing share of the labour 
force while reducing the technological gap with the world’s frontier. Failure to do so would eventually 
lead the economy to low- or middle- income traps, in which only a small fraction of the population 
would benefit from the gains of economic growth and technological progress. 
Building on previous contributions from Post-Keynesian, Neo-Schumpeterian and Latin-American 
Structuralism literature, this paper sets up a theoretical model of catching-up among nations aimed at 
formalizing this idea by exploring the dynamic interactions between structural change and 
technological upgrading in the process of economic development. The focus of the model is on a 
“representative” nation of the South that is characterized by having: i) a dual structure (i.e., a large 
share of labour force working on low-productive-traditional activities that coexists with a small fraction 
of workers employed in modern activities); ii) a high degree of technological backwardness in the 
modern activities; and iii) a binding restriction on the external accounts. Under these circumstances, 
the dynamic behaviour of two key variables will determine the success or failure of this economy over 
time: the share of labour in the modern sector and the relative stock of technological knowledge of the 
modern sector compared to that of the world technological leader. Depending on initial conditions and 
underlying parameters, the southern economy would be attracted towards four different equilibrium 
points, each of them entailing extremely different implications in terms of long-run development. 
After analysing the dynamic properties of the model, simple simulations are implemented in order to 
illustrate a number of structural trajectories that might shed new light on the complex forces acting 
behind the success or failure of economic development. 
Keywords: Catching-up, Dual Economy, Balance-of-Payments Restriction, Economic Development. 
JEL Classification: O11, O33, O41, F43. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early work of the development pioneers, back in the 1950s, one of the major concerns of the 
economic development discipline has been related to the ability of the economic system to absorb the 
whole working population in productive activities. According to these theorists, the dual character of 
less advanced nations imposed important restrictions on their development potential. In their view, 
only overcoming that duality through a process of structural change would lead them out of poverty. 
More than half a century later, this issue continues to be at the core of policy and academic debates. In 
many cases, the long expected transformation of poor-rural societies into modern urbanized and 
industrial economies has left a bitter flavour. Huge urban conglomerations have absorbed increasing 
number of rural migrants who –instead of finding good-quality jobs in modern industries– ended up 
enlarging the pool of self-employed and informal workers in service activities. The sectoral structure 
of many countries has radically changed during these decades, but their dual nature has remained the 
same: labour markets are still sharply divided between a small fraction of good-quality, highly-paid 
jobs in modern industry and modern services and a large body of the working population employed in 
bad-quality, low-income activities, typically informal and in many cases oriented towards subsistence. 
From a dual-economy perspective, this concern would actually be reflecting the need for higher rates 
of labour absorption in the modern sector of the economy. In a globalized world, this goal could 
hardly be achieved unless the modern sector is international competitive. In fact, it could be argued 
that the long-run survival of any working opportunity created in that sector would heavily rely upon its 
capacity to face global competition. 
It follows that the ability of the modern sector to absorb labour needs to be evaluated together with its 
capacity to compete in world markets. This capacity, in turn, would ultimately be shaped by the 
innovation and technological capabilities of the country. Though price competitiveness might be a 
suitable mode of entry into international markets, there is today a widespread consensus that this is not 
a sustainable avenue towards development. Ultimately the factors that really matter for international 
competitiveness are quality upgrading, quality differentiation and technological change. 
The present paper tries to develop this line of reasoning. The old question about creation of productive 
employment in dual economies is re-examined from a theoretical perspective that acknowledges the 
fundamental role played by innovation and technological capabilities in the process of development. In 
order to do so, it presents and evaluates a formal model that, combining elements from Post-
Keynesian, Neo-Schumpeterian and Latin-American Structuralist literature, explores the factors that 
ultimately determine the possibilities of a developing economy to surpass its dual character and enter a 
path of successful catching up with the advanced economies. In the model, the developing economy is 
characterized by two distinguishing features. The first feature is the presence of an extended 
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traditional/informal sector (i.e., a large portion of its labour force is working in extremely low 
productive activities that use obsolete technologies and mainly produces for its own subsistence). The 
second feature is the existence of an important degree of technological backwardness in the non-
traditional sectors (i.e., a significant technological gap in the modern activities as compared to the 
advanced economies). 
The focus of the model is on the dynamical interaction between both features in the process of 
economic development. From this perspective, successful development entails a joint improvement in 
both dimensions up to the point at which modern activities not only become dominant but also manage 
to catch up with the world frontier. That is, they manage to close the technological gap while 
absorbing most of the workers from the traditional sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly summarize the different contributions 
of the literature that have inspired the model. Next, in Section 3 we present the building blocks of the 
model and in Section 4 we analyse the dynamic behaviour of the system. In addition, we study the 
viability conditions and stability properties of the multiple equilibria obtained. Section 5 brings the 
mathematical formalization to a more tangible ground. By means of simple simulation it presents a set 
of structural trajectories that might shed light on the various obstacles that developing economies need 
to overcome before entering on a successful development path. Finally, in Section 6 we present the 
main conclusions that might be derived from the analysis and several lines along which our model 
could be extended. A mathematical appendix with some technicalities of the model is included at the 
end of the paper.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The idea that technology plays a central role in the process of economic growth would hardly be 
disputed by any economist nowadays. The specific ways in which new technologies are translated into 
the productive process and, more broadly, how their benefits can be reaped at national level, however, 
are still subject to debate. 
A strand of literature that has significantly contributed to our understanding of these phenomena in the 
context of economic development is the so called catching-up literature. This literature originates in a 
series of contributions1 that –from an economic historical perspective– investigated the process of 
catching-up in latecomer countries during the last two centuries, with special focus on the creation and 
international diffusion of new technologies (Castellacci (2007)). All these scholars share the idea that 
catching-up, far from being an automatic process, requires important efforts by the follower 
economies in order to build the necessary capabilities that will ultimately enable them to benefit from 
the technology created by the leading economy. In terms of Abramovitz (1994), these conditions fall 
in two broad categories: technological congruence and social capability. Technological congruence 
refers to the degree to which the follower and the leader share similar characteristics in terms of, for 
example, market size and factor supply, and therefore the technologies originating in the advanced 
economy are relevant or can be applied in the host economy. Social capability, in turn, refers to the 
capabilities that developing countries need to develop in order to catch-up, such as education and 
infrastructure. The latter concept has also been associated with the idea of absorptive capacity, which 
in the context of development economics would refer to the ability of developing countries to 
assimilate new knowledge (Fagerberg et al. (2010)). 
Early attempts to formalize this body of ideas within a coherent mathematical framework can be found 
in Fagerberg (1988a), (1988b) and Verspagen (1991), (1993). The models proposed in these 
contributions try to explain macroeconomic growth from a catching-up perspective. A technologically 
backward economy (the follower) has a technology-gap that separates it from a technologically 
advanced economy (the leader), and the changes over time in that gap ultimately determines the 
growth potential of the less developed economy. Among other things, the follower can diminish this 
gap by exploiting its backward position, imitating or using advanced technologies developed by the 
leader. This process, however, is not costless and depends on the specific degree of technological 
congruence and social capability of the follower country. Catching up is, therefore, not guaranteed and 
the follower might even fall further behind. 
                                                            
1 Among others, we can mention: Abramovitz (1986); Freeman (1987); Gerschenkron (1962); Veblen (1915). For a recent 
review of this literature, see Fagerberg and Godinho (2005) and Fagerberg et al. (2010). 
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More recently, some authors have tried to build a more comprehensive framework, integrating the 
basic ideas of the catching-up tradition into the macroeconomic setting of Post-Keynesian cumulative-
causation-type models. Following previous developments in this line, Castellacci (2002) and León-
Ledesma (2002) 2  proposed models of catching-up in which demand-side factors play a more 
fundamental role than in the original contributions of the catching-up tradition. These models assume 
that growth is demand-led (in particular, export-led) and that there is a dynamic interactive process 
connecting the growth of aggregate demand and the growth of productivity. This process would 
emerge from two interrelated mechanisms: on one hand, the so called Kaldor-Verdoorn effects of 
increasing returns to scale that links productivity growth with demand growth3. On the other hand, the 
external causation mechanism that links demand growth with productivity growth through the effect of 
the latter on price-competitiveness and thus exports4. Therefore, an increase of output growth (due to 
export growth) would induce a higher increase in the growth of productivity that would feed through 
into lower inflation. This in turn, would improve price competitiveness, allow for higher exports and 
thus start the process again in a cumulative-causation fashion. Within this framework, catching up, as 
analysed in the traditional approach, can be retarded or stimulated by demand-side factors. 
This sort of models is thus extremely useful to incorporate the complex interactions between supply 
and demand factors in the process of economic development, in contexts in which technological 
opportunities might lead to productivity gains that can feed back into higher demand and thus higher 
gains in productivity. Such a setting bring traditional models of catching-up much closer to the reality 
of developing economies, where demand factors play a fundamental role in the overall behaviour of 
the economy. Nevertheless, they still have at least two important limitations when depicting a follower 
economy that belongs to the developing world. 
On one hand, they are based on an export-led framework that does not take into consideration major 
bottle-necks to aggregate growth, induced by the increase in imported goods that takes place as 
countries develop. That is, the external balance of payment restriction is not explicitly taken into 
consideration. In a recent review of Post-Keynesian models of aggregate growth, Robert Blecker 
demonstrates that the equilibrium solution of export-led cumulative-causation (ELCC) models is not 
sustainable in the long-run precisely because they lack a plausible external restriction (Blecker 
(2013)). In his view, models of growth based on a balance of payment constraint (BOPC) in the 
tradition of Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) are better suit to deliver sustainable long-run equilibrium 
outcomes. It follows that expanding the models proposed in Castellacci (2002) and León-Ledesma 
(2002) to a context of a BOPC economy would not only provide a picture that is closer to the reality of 
                                                            
2 Both authors builds on previous contribution from Amable (1993), De Benedictis (1998) and Targetti and Foti (1997). 
3 Following Boyer (1988), this has been typically labeled “productivity regime”. 
4 The “demand regime”, in Boyer’s terminology. 
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developing countries but would also enable an equilibrium solution that is actually stable in the long 
run. 
On the other hand –and perhaps more fundamentally– the aggregate nature of these models disregards 
a salient feature of the developing world, namely, the dual character of their productive structures. 
When it comes to developing nations, an aggregate view of the country might result in misleading 
conclusions. A well-documented fact about poor (and to a certain extent, middle-income) nations is 
the coexistence of modern, highly productive and technological advanced activities alongside low-
productive, typically subsistence-oriented, traditional activities. A long strand of literature –ranging 
from the development pioneers5 to the Latin American Structuralists6– has emphasized that each of 
these sets of activities have their own functioning mechanism and characteristics and they cannot be 
analysed as a single entity. Moreover, the very concept of structural change has been typically 
associated with the idea of shifting resources (primarily labour) from the low-productive-traditional 
sector to the high-productive-modern sector. An explicit consideration of this division in the follower 
country would therefore lead to a more clear understanding of the role of structural change in the 
process of catching-up. 
In light of the above, recent contributions rooted in the Neo-Structuralist tradition have tried to 
combine the Post-Keynesian model of demand-led cumulative-causation growth with a Lewis-type 
model of dual economy (Cimoli et al. (2005); Ocampo et al. (2009); Rada (2007)). The goal of these 
models is to formalize the forces behind dynamic structural change, employment and growth in a dual 
economy with an abundant labour surplus. The economy is divided in two sectors. An established 
modern capitalist or formal sector (that typically comprises industry along with parts of agriculture 
and services) coexists with a subsistence or informal sector in which production relies only on low-
wage labour. The modern sector functions in a Kaldorian demand-led cumulative-causation manner. 
The subsistence sector, instead, has decreasing (or at best, constant) returns to scale, and has an 
institutionally-based gap with the real incomes of the modern sector7. The underlying idea is that 
labour that is not employed in the modern sector survives by finding some sort of economic activity in 
the informal sector. This part of the labour force is thus under-employed and constitutes a sort of 
reserve army. Interestingly, these models manage to capture different mechanisms by which demand 
growth, productivity growth and dynamic structural change are related to each other. Moreover, they 
                                                            
5 Obliged references in this regard are Lewis (1954); Ranis and Fei (1961); Sen (1966). For recent reviews on dual models 
rooted in this tradition see Temple (2005) and Ranis (2012). 
6 The Latin American Structuralism has worked with the related concept of Structural Heterogeneity, according to which (in 
Latin America) there is not a sharp divide between subsistence and modern activities, but rather a continuous of activities 
with very different levels of technological sophistication. For a recent reviews on this literature see Cimoli (2005) and 
ECLAC (2012). 
7 In the model proposed by Cimoli et al. (2005) the wage differential between the two sectors arises from an efficiency wage 
formulation. 
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address a fundamental issue of development already highlighted in the introduction of this paper: the 
inability of the economic system to create enough productive employment. An important limitation, 
however, is that they only partially explore the role of innovation and technological catching-up in this 
process. In particular, neither the dynamics of the technological gap over time nor the possible 
productivity gains arising from international spillovers are modelled within these formulations. It 
follows that there is interesting ground to integrate this line of research with the catching-up models 
previously detailed. 
In this paper we try to reconcile these traditions in a single, simplified framework. Our point of 
departure is a model along the lines of León-Ledesma (2002) and Castellacci (2002), in which the 
Post-Keynesian side is based on a BOPC model rather than a ELCC model. The main extension, 
however, lies in the characterization of the follower country as a dual economy. Accordingly, we split 
the developing economy into two sectors and we model the basic interactions among them along the 
lines proposed in Cimoli et al. (2005), Ocampo et al. (2009) and Rada (2007). 
A series of recent papers has built models of similar inspiration. Botta (2009) presents a structuralist 
North-South model of economic convergence, that also incorporates elements from the Post-
Keynesian and Post-Schumpeterian literature. Interestingly, the model distinguishes between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries and studies the role of industrialization in the process 
of catching-up. The share of manufacturing in total GDP is used as the key variable representing the 
productive structure and the movements in time of this endogenous variable determines the growth 
potential of the South. In a similar vein, Cimoli and Porcile (2010) and (2013) present models also 
rooted in the Neo-Structuralist tradition and try to integrate elements from the Post-Keynesian and 
Post-Schumpeterian schools within that framework. A distinguishing feature of these models is the use 
of a multi-sectoral framework –based in Ricardian-type trade models– according to which the 
productive structure of each economy (North and South) is represented by a continuum of goods with 
different technological characteristics. By means of this setting, the models are able to analyse the 
particular outcomes of certain trade specialization patterns on the growth, productivity and 
technological potential of the follower economy. 
In all these models, however, the dynamic interactions between the degree of duality and the 
possibilities for catching up are not fully explored. As we will see, the main contribution of our model 
relies precisely on the examination of this sort of interactions and its evolution along the process of 
economic development. Hence, our model contributes to the literature that has tried to bring together 
these related traditions in a coherent framework to analyse the basic problems of development. In the 
following section we detail the building blocks of this model. 
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3. THE MODEL 
Following the literature previously reviewed, we propose a model in which a developing, 
technologically-backward economy tries to catch-up with an advanced, technologically-leading 
economy. The model is written from the perspective of the developing country that is also generically 
denoted as the South, the follower or the domestic economy. The advanced economy, in turn, is 
generically denoted as the North, the leader or the foreign economy, and is identified by the 
superscript f. 
Besides being technologically backward, the follower has a dual productive structure. A low-
productive traditional sector (identified with the subscript S), that is mainly oriented towards 
subsistence, coexists with a modern, high-productive, capitalist sector (identified with the subscript 
M). The model works with the simplifying assumption that each of these sectors produces a unique, 
homogeneous good. In reality, of course, these sectors are representing a wide set of heterogeneous 
activities producing very different goods. The traditional sector would typically encompass two broad 
sets of activities: subsistence agriculture and urban informal services. The remaining sectors (non-
subsistence agriculture, industry and formal services) would all be contained within the modern sector 
aggregate. Although this heterogeneity within each broad sector is not explicitly modelled, it is 
implicitly captured by the various parameters that define the behaviour of the economy8. 
Since the focus of the model is placed on the dynamic behaviour of the southern economy along time, 
the setting is built in terms of the growth rates of a number of key variables. In particular, two 
variables stand out: the share of workers in the modern sector (denoted by the Greek letter ߣ) and the 
relative stock of technological knowledge in the modern sector as compared to the leading economy 
(denoted by the Greek letter ߩ). The success or failure of the follower economy will ultimately be 
determined by the movement in time of these variables. Successful economic development will entail 
a joint increase in both variables up to the point where the modern sector not only becomes dominant 
(ߣ gets closer to one) but also manages to catch up with the technological frontier (ߩ gets closer to 
one). This, however, would not be the only possible outcome of the model. Intermediate situations in 
which one or both of these variables remain trapped in a low level equilibrium are also possible.  
Before entering into the detailed specification of the model, it is worth stressing some of the prime 
assumptions regarding the functioning of each sector. 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 This point will be developed further in the next sections. 
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Modern sector: 
The modern sector is composed by firms that produce for the domestic and external demand and set 
prices applying a mark-up rule over unit labour cost. Wages in the sector, in turn, are in part 
determined by the size of the traditional sector that acts as a “reserve army”. For this reason, increases 
in the share of labour in the modern sector will lead to higher pressures on wage inflation that might 
eventually erode price-competitiveness at the international level. 
The technology in use in the modern sector has increasing returns to scale on labour. Productivity 
gains in this sector also depend on the growth of the technological knowledge applied to production. 
This knowledge, in turn, is assumed to depend in three major factors (that will be explained in detail 
later): a) domestic technological efforts; b) international spillovers; and c) induced innovations due to 
the modernization of the economy. 
Finally, the sector is assumed to have a binding restriction on external accounts. That is, the rhythm of 
production is determined by the availability of foreign exchange. Since it is further assumed that there 
is no accumulation of financial capital, this implies that exports in this sector should grow at exactly 
the same rate as imports. Export potential, in turn, is assumed to depend on price and non-price 
factors. While the first are determined by the dynamics of wages and productivity, the second are 
directly determined by the level of technological sophistication of the sector, as captured by the 
technology gap. In particular, it is assumed that the income-elasticity of export demand has an 
endogenous component that depends negatively on the gap. The greater the distance to the 
technological frontier, the lower the income elasticity of the products that a country can produce. 
Traditional sector:  
The traditional sector, in contrast, is assumed to produce for its own demand, using only labour. 
Therefore, it does not provide any demand-push effect on the modern sector. The level of productivity 
(and thus, average income) is very low (by definition, lower than in the modern sector), and for this 
reason the workers of this sector are always willing to move to the modern sector if there are working 
opportunities there. The technology in use has non-increasing returns to scale. Income per worker will 
thus tend to increase –or at least, remain constant– when labour is absorbed by the modern sector. Last 
but not least, it is assumed that there is no interaction between this sector and the foreign economy. 
That is, there are neither imports nor exports from this sector. 
 
This short summary of the main assumptions sets the ground to specify the detailed setting of the 
model. We start by describing the functioning of the modern sector, then we describe the functioning 
of the traditional sector and in the next section we study the dynamic properties of the model.  
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3.1. Economic Growth in the Modern Sector 
Following conventional BOPC growth models, our point of departure to characterize the dynamic 
functioning of this economy is the external restriction. Ruling out the possibility of financial capital 
movements, net income payments and unilateral transfers, this restriction states that, in the long run, 
the value of exports should equal the value of imports9. Since the traditional sector is not involved in 
trade, total imports and total exports in the South will be equivalent to the value of exports (ܺெ) and 
imports (ܯெ) of the modern sector. Therefore, the restriction (expressed in domestic prices) can be 
stated as follow: 
 ெܲ ∗ ܺெ ൌ ݁ ∗ ெܲ௙ ∗ ܯெ (1)  
where, ܲ stands for prices, ݁ is the nominal exchange rate, the subscript M represents the modern 
sector and the superscript f represents the foreign economy.  
Since our interest relies on the dynamic behaviour of the economy, our focus will be placed in the 
dynamic version of this restriction, according to which the value of exports should growth at the same 
rate than the value of imports. Log-differentiation of equation (1) yields: 
 ෠ܲெ ൅ ෠ܺெ ൌ ݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ ൅ ܯ෡ெ (2)  
where, a hat over the variable represents the rate of growth. 
Next, we introduce the specific equations for the growth rates in the volume of exports and imports. 
Following the literature, we assume that both rates are determined by changes in relative prices (real 
exchange rate) and income. That is, 
 ෠ܺெ ൌ ߟ൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ൯ ൅ ߝ መܼ (3)  
 ܯ෡ெ ൌ െߥ൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ൯ ൅ ߯ ෠ܻெ (4)  
where, ߟ and ߥ are the price elasticities of demand for exports and demand for imports respectively; ߝ 
and ߯ are the income elasticities of demand for exports and demand for imports; መܼ  stands for the 
                                                            
9 Financial flows could be easily incorporated into the analysis. Following Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) an extra term 
capturing the net capital inflows could be included in equation (1). Since our focus is on the dynamic version of the 
restriction, in such a case, our implicit assumption would be that these capital flows remain constant in the long run (i.e., 
there is no explosive accumulation of external debt or international reserves). 
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growth rate of foreign income, ෠ܻெ represents the growth rate of output in the modern sector10 and the 
term within brackets (݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ) provides the rate of real currency depreciation. 
Equations (3) and (4) are conventional equations for the growth rate of exports and import demand. 
Exports will depend positively on real currency depreciation and world income while imports will 
depend negatively on real currency depreciation and positively on the domestic income of the modern 
sector. 
Making use of equations (3) and (4) in our dynamical external restriction (equation (2)) and solving 
for the growth rate of modern sector output yields: 
 ෠ܻெ௕௣ ൌ
ሺߟ ൅ ߥ െ 1ሻᇩᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇫ
௔
൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ൯ ൅ ߝ መܼ
߯ ൌ
ܽ൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ൯ ൅ ߝ መܼ
߯  
(5)  
Equation (5) represents the conventional BOP constrained growth rate. It basically states that the 
output growth of the modern sector will depend positively on price competitiveness (as captured by 
the term: ܽ൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ൯ሻ and foreign income growth (as captured by the term ߝ መܼ), and negatively to 
its appetite for imports (as captured by the income-elasticity of imports, ߯). 
If the parameter ܽ is positive, then the Marshall-Lerner condition holds and therefore an increase in 
the rate of real depreciation will put the modern sector on a higher growth path. If, however, ܽ ൌ 0 or 
relative PPP is assumed (that is: ݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ෠ܲெ ൌ 0), then the first part of the numerator becomes zero 
and equation (5) boils down to the so called Thirlwall's law: 
 ෠ܻெ௕௣ ൌ
ߝ
߯ መܼ  
In this case, only changes in income elasticities or world income growth would have an impact in 
modern sector growth. Throughout this paper, however, we will assume that the Marshall-Lerner 
condition holds (ܽ ൐ 0)11 and we will not impose any PPP condition12. Therefore output growth in the 
modern sector will also be affected by changes in price competitiveness. 
                                                            
10 It is important to remember that, by construction, we are assuming that the acquisition of foreign goods (import demand) is 
only done by domestic agents involved in the modern sector. For this reason, the growth of imports is only related to the 
output growth of the modern sector. 
11 The empirical evidence regarding the validity of this condition is mixed. A detailed recent review can be found in Bahmani 
et al. (2013). According to their analysis, in 56 of the 91 cases reviewed the condition holds. However, the authors also 
emphasize that many of these studies would not satisfy further significant tests. 
12 The validity of the PPP condition has also been long debated in the literature. In a recent review, Blecker (2013) concludes 
that PPP seems to hold only in the very long-run (half century or more) and mainly between countries that are structurally 
similar. The dynamics that we are interested to analyze in this paper are more likely to take place in periods that are shorter 
 14 
 
An important feature of our model is that both elements (income elasticity and price competitiveness) 
will ultimately depend on the two key variables defined in the introduction of this section: ߩ and ߣ. In 
what follows we introduce the dynamic equations for the various components that affect the growth 
rate stated in equation (5) and build a linear system that ultimately depends on these state variables. 
To begin with, we endogenize the income elasticity of export demand ( ߝ ). Inspired in Neo-
Schumpeterian and Neo-Structuralist literature, we assume that this elasticity depends negatively on 
the technological gap of the modern sector (ܩெ). That is: 
 ߝ ൌ ߦ െ ߰ܩெ (6)  
where, ߦ ൐ 0 represents the income-elasticity of the state-of-art version of the good exported by the 
modern sector and ߰ ൐ 0 represents the penalty on that income-elasticity brought by the technological 
backwardness of the South. 
The rationale behind equation (6) is that a certain good can be produced using a wide array of 
technologies, ranging from state-of-art technologies (ܩெ ൌ 0) to technologies that are completely 
obsolete by international standards ( ܩெ ൌ 1 ). These technologies, in turn, will affect the 
characteristics of the good. In particular, we assume that the quality and nature of goods that an 
economy can produce changes as it come closer to the frontier. Since the demand elasticity of high 
quality and sophisticated goods tends to be higher than that of low quality goods, then a negative 
relationship can be traced between the income elasticity of exports and the technological gap. In a 
way, the term ߰ܩெ would be capturing the ability of the country to achieve better quality and higher 
product differentiation in that particular exporting good. 
The technological gap (ܩெ ), in turn, is defined as one minus the relative stock of technological 
knowledge of the South as compared to that of the leading economy (ߩ). That is, 
 ܩெ ൌ 1 െ ߩ (7)  
 ߩ ൌ ெܶ
ெܶ
௙ (8)  
where ܶ stands for the stock of technological knowledge. 
Next, we introduce an equation for the dynamic of prices in the modern sector. Following Post-
Keynesian literature, we assume that prices in this sector are set by adding a mark-up over unit labour 
cost. The growth rate of prices will thus be represented by: 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
than half a century and between very dissimilar countries. Therefore, not assuming PPP seems to be more in line with the 
available empirical evidence on the issue. 
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 ෠ܲெ ൌ ߬̂ ൅ ෡ܹெ െ ෠ܴெ (9)  
where ߬̂ stands for the rate of change in (one plus) the mark-up over unit labour cost, ෡ܹெ represents 
the rate of wage inflation in the modern sector and ෠ܴெ stands for the rate of growth of productivity in 
the modern sector. 
Following most literature on this topic, we assume that the mark-up is exogenously determined (by 
institutional factors) and constant in the medium/long run. Therefore the rate of change in the mark-up 
(߬̂) will be equal to zero. Wage inflation in the modern sector ( ෡ܹெ), instead, will be endogenous to the 
model. In particular, it is assumed to depend negatively on the relative size of the traditional sector. As 
long as the traditional sector is large, wage inflation will be small. However, as the modern sector 
expands and absorb workers from the traditional sector, pressures for wage increases will start to 
grow, partly eroding the price competitiveness advantage that the South might have at initial levels of 
development. The following equation captures this dynamical behaviour: 
 ෡ܹெ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߠߣ (10) 
where ߱ represents wage inflation exogenous to the model (due to, for example, institutional factors 
not explicitly modelled) and ߠ is a positive parameter that captures the sensitivity of wage inflation to 
modern's sector share on total employment. 
Plugging equations (6) to (10) in (5) we get a new expression for the BOPC growth rate of output that 
depends on our state variables (ߩ and ߣ), the productivity growth of the modern sector and a set of 
exogenous variables: 
 
෠ܻெ௕௣ ൌ
ܽ ൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ߱൯ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇫ
௕
െ ܽߠߣ ൅ ቎ሺߦ െ ߰ሻᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
௙
൅ ߰ߩ቏ መܼ ൅ ܽ ෠ܴெ
߯ 	
ൌ ൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂ መܼ൯ ൅ ൫߰ መܼ൯ߩ െ ሺܽߠሻߣ ൅ ܽ ෠ܴெ߯  
(11) 
where ݂ ൌ ሺߦ െ ߰ሻ stands for the income elasticity of the less technological sophisticated version of 
the good exported by the modern sector (good produced with ߩ ൌ 0 ) and ܾ ൌ ൫݁̂ ൅ ෠ܲெ௙ െ ߱൯ 
encompasses the set of pressures for real exchange depreciation that are exogenous to the model13. 
                                                            
13 Since the term b includes the rate of nominal depreciation of the domestic currency (݁̂), it has a very important role from a 
policy perspective. The management of the nominal exchange rate by the monetary authority will have an impact on the 
whole dynamic of the system through this term. Comparative-static exercises at the final section of the paper will illustrate 
further this point. 
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Looking at the numerator of Equation (11) we can already notice that the BOPC growth rate of the 
modern sector depends positively on the relative stock of technology, the growth rate of labour 
productivity and the set of exogenous variables affecting price-competitiveness and export demand. 
The share of the modern sector in total employment, instead, has a negative impact and therefore 
brings a counterbalancing effect that reduces the growth rate of output as the economy develops. 
Using equation (11) and bearing in mind that, by definition, the growth rate of employment should be 
identical to the growth rate of output minus the growth rate of labour productivity (ܮ෠ெ ≡ ෠ܻெ െ ෠ܴெ), 
we can derive an expression for the rate of growth of employment in the modern sector that is 
compatible with the external restriction: 
 ܮ෠ெ௕௣ ൌ
൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂ መܼ൯ ൅ ൫߰ መܼ൯ߩ െ ሺܽߠሻߣ െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻ ෠ܴெ
߯  (12) 
In order to fully characterize the modern sector, we still need to define the factors that determine 
productivity growth. Following Castellacci (2002) and León-Ledesma (2002) we assume that 
productivity gains in this sector are ruled by three main elements: embodied technological progress 
(proxied by the Investment-Output ratio, ݇)14, increasing dynamic returns on labour (the so called 
Kaldor-Verdoorn effect) and improvements in the domestic technological knowledge ( ෠ܶெ). That is: 
 ෠ܴெ ൌ ߤ݇ ൅ ߛெܮ෠ெ ൅ ߙ ෠ܶெ (13) 
where ߤ, ߛெ and ߙ are positive parameters that capture the sensitivity of productivity gains to capital 
intensification, labour growth15 and domestic technological knowledge growth respectively. 
Following the catching-up literature, the growth rate of the stock of technological knowledge is 
assumed to depend on R&D domestic innovation efforts and on international spillovers stemming 
from the diffusion of technological knowledge generated by the leader. While the former is taken as 
exogenous to the model (represented by the parameter ߞ), the latter is assumed to depend positively on 
the size of the technological gap (as captured by the term ߪܩெ)16. In addition to these elements, our 
                                                            
14 Embodied technological progress might be better captured using more specific variables (accounting, for example, for the 
quality of the capital stock). Here, however, we preferred to keep the original formulation of the referred models. 
15 The parameter ߛெ is equivalent to the traditional K-V coefficient on output growth but in terms of employment growth. 
Equation (13) could also be expressed with increasing dynamic returns on output. In that case, we would have: ෠ܴெ ൌ
߶௞݇ ൅ ߶௅ܮ෠ெ ൅ ߶் ෠ܶெ , which would look very similar to the equations used in Castellacci (2002) and León-Ledesma 
(2002). Both equations are in fact equivalent, and the relationship between their parameters can be described as follows: 
߶௞ ൌ ߤ ሺ1 ൅ ߛெሻ⁄ ; ߶௅ ൌ ߛெ ሺ1 ൅ ߛெሻ⁄ ; ߶் ൌ ߙ ሺ1 ൅ ߛெሻ⁄ . Since our focus in the following sections will be placed on 
employment absorption, we prefer to express this equation in terms of employment growth rather than output growth. A 
discussion on the various forms of modelling the K-V effect can be found in Pieper (2003). 
16 Given this formulation, the larger is the gap, the larger is the growth rate of technological knowledge due to international 
spillovers. It is important to highlight that this relationship is assumed to be linear. Previous literature on this issue has also 
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model also incorporates a Hicksean induced-innovation channel in line with recent Post-Keynesian 
models on economic growth (See for example, Naastepad (2005); Palley (2012), (2013)). According to 
this literature, the rate of growth in the technological knowledge also depends on the availability of 
resources in the economy, and hence, a positive relationship can be established between the rate of 
employment and the rate of technological progress. In our model, this channel is represented by a 
positive relationship between the share of labour in the modern sector and the growth rate of 
technological knowledge (as captured by the term ߚߣ): the absorption of labour in the modern sector 
reduces the size of the reserve army and therefore induces firms to increase their rates of innovation. 
The following equation summarizes these channels17: 
 ෠ܶெ ൌ ߞ ൅ ߚߣ ൅ ߪܩெ (14) 
Combining equations (13) and (14) and replacing ܩெ for its definition, we get a new expression for 
the growth rate of productivity in the modern sector: 
 ෠ܴெ ൌ ߤ݇ ൅ ߛெܮ෠ெ ൅ ߙ ൥ሺߞ ൅ ߪሻᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ௗ
െ ߪߩ ൅ ߚߣ൩ ൌ ߤ݇ ൅ ߛெܮ෠ெ ൅ ߙሺ݀ െ ߪߩ ൅ ߚߣሻ (15) 
where ݀ ൌ ሺߞ ൅ ߪሻ  is a positive parameter representing the autonomous technological knowledge 
accumulation in the South. 
The introduction of a Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient in equation (13) give rise to the so called 
"cumulative causation" mechanism according to which an increase in the equilibrium growth rate of 
employment in equation (12) will lead to an increase in productivity growth that will reinforce the 
original increase in employment (through the last term of equation (12)) restarting the cycle. This 
cumulative cycle has been approached in the literature as an interactive process between two regimes: 
the demand regime (DR) and the productivity regime (PR). Taken together, these regimes constitute a 
system of two linear equations that in our case would be represented as follows: 
 ܮ෠ெ஽ோ ൌ ൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂
መܼ൯ ൅ ൫߰ መܼ൯ߩ െ ሺܽߠሻߣ
߯ െ
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻ
߯ ෠ܴெ (DR) 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
incorporated non-linear specifications for the spillovers in order to capture the fact that for extremely large technological 
gaps the imitation of technologies might no longer be possible (see Castellacci (2002); Verspagen (1991), (1993)). 
17 This equation is also based on the corresponding equations used by Castellacci (2002) and León-Ledesma (2002). The 
main difference is that our equation explicitly considers the dual character of this economy by introducing the term ߚߣ. 
However, to keep things simple, it does not consider the effects of output growth and cumulative output on technological 
knowledge growth (as is the case in León-Ledesma (2002)) and the international spillovers are introduced in a linear 
fashion (instead of the non-linear specification used in Castellacci (2002)). 
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 ܮ෠ெ௉ோ ൌ െ
ሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ െ ߙߪߩ ൅ ߙߚߣ
ߛெ ൅
1
ߛெ
෠ܴெ (PR) 
To be stable, this system requires the (absolute) value of the slope of PR to be larger than the 
(absolute) value of the slope of DR18. That is: 
 ฬ 1ߛெฬ ൐ ቤെ
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻ
߯ ቤ ⟹ ߯ ൐ |ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛெ| (Cond. 1) 
If Condition 1 holds, this setting for the dynamical behaviour of the modern sector will deliver stable 
equilibrium values for its output, employment and productivity growth that will ultimately depend on 
the state variables of our model (ߩ and ߣ). 
It is interesting to notice that the condition will always hold if ߛெ is less than one and ߯ is larger than 
ܽ. That is, if the increasing returns of labour are lower than one and the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
positive but lower than the income-elasticity of imports. Both assumptions seem to be in line with the 
literature, and therefore, in what follows we will assume that they hold19. This will already ensure that, 
if the dynamic behaviour of the state variables is stable, the final solution of the system will also be 
stable. 
Solving the linear system formed by the DR and PR, and replacing the results in equation (11), we get 
the equilibrium values for output, productivity and employment growth in the modern sector: 
 ෠ܻெ∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ߛெሻ൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂ መܼ൯ ൅ ܽሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ
݃ ൅
ሺ1 ൅ ߛெሻ߰ መܼ െ ܽߙߪ
݃ ߩ ൅
ܽߙߚ െ ܽߠሺ1 ൅ ߛெሻ
݃ ߣ (16) 
 ෠ܴெ∗ ൌ
ߛெ൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂ መܼ൯ ൅ ߯ሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ
݃ ൅
ߛெ߰ መܼ െ ߯ߙߪ
݃ ߩ ൅
߯ߙߚ െ ܽߠߛெ
݃ ߣ (17) 
 ܮ෠ெ∗ ൌ
൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂ መܼ൯ െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ
݃ ൅
߰ መܼ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪ
݃ ߩ െ
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߚ ൅ ܽߠ
݃ ߣ (18) 
where ݃ ൌ ߯ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛܯ  
                                                            
18 To see this, we can introduce a lag structure in the equation DR, solve the system and analyze the stability of the 
equilibrium as if it was a single difference equation. In that case, the eigenvalue of the corresponding equilibrium would be: 
ሾെ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛெ ߯⁄ ሿ. It follows that the solution will be stable if and only if the absolute value of this expression is smaller 
than one. That is, if: |െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛெ ߯⁄ | ൏ 1, that is equivalent to the condition stated in the text. 
19 Regarding the first assumption, most studies find a K-V coefficient (in output terms) of about 0.3 to 0.5, that would 
correspond to a coefficient in terms of employment growth lower than 1. As for the second condition, Wu (2008), for 
example, provides estimates for ܽ and ߯ in a sample of 35 countries, and his results show that in 17 of the 23 countries 
where the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, ߯ is larger than ܽ. 
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Since ݃ is equivalent to the numerator of the slope differential between the DR and PR, it will always 
be positive. Moreover, since we have assumed that ߯ ൐ ܽ (in order to ensure that condition 1 holds), 
we can already notice that our state variables will have counterbalancing effects in the capacity of the 
modern sector to absorb labour: while increases in ߩ  will always lead to higher labour demand, 
increases in ߣ will always contract the growth rate of labour in the modern sector. This is so because 
the assumption that ߯ is larger than ܽ implies that the negative impact of productivity gains on labour 
absorption cannot be compensated by the positive impact of the increasing demand due to improved 
price-competitiveness20. 
3.2. Economic Growth in the Traditional Sector 
As mentioned before, a distinguishing feature of the southern economy in our model is the presence of 
a large traditional sector employing an important portion of the labour force. In fact, we work under 
the simplifying assumption that the labour force not employed in the modern sector finds some way of 
survival in the traditional sector. Therefore, our model resembles a full-employment model, but with 
the important remark that a major share of the labour population is under-employed in low-productive 
activities21. 
The dynamical behaviour of this sector is modelled in an extremely simplified fashion (in line with, 
for example, Ocampo et al. (2009)). We assume non-increasing returns to scale, with labour as the 
only input. In addition, we assume an exogenous growth rate in total labour force, and thus, labour 
growth in this sector is obtained as a residual. Under this setting, the whole dynamics of this sector is 
driven by the dynamics of labour growth in the modern sector (as stated in equation (18)). 
The following equation represents the growth rate of productivity in the traditional sector: 
 ෠ܴௌ ൌ ߡ ൅ ߛௌܮ෠ௌ (19) 
where the subscript S identifies the traditional sector, ߡ is a positive parameter reflecting autonomous 
productivity gains in this sector and ߛௌ is the equivalent of ߛெ for the traditional sector (that is, the 
sensitivity of productivity to changes in labour growth). In our setting, we assume that ߛௌ  is non-
positive, reflecting the fact that this sector –as opposed to the modern sector– does not benefit from 
increasing returns to labour.  
                                                            
20 To see this we should bear in mind that while productivity gains (by definition) have a one-to-one negative impact on 
labour growth, the positive impact on output (and thus labour) growth is partially restrained by the relative increase of 
imports associated with output (and thus income) growth. The positive impact of productivity gains on output growth is, 
according to equation (11), equal to ሺܽ ߯⁄ ሻ. If ߯ ൐ ܽ, then this effect will always be lower than one, and therefore the net 
effect on employment absorption will be negative. 
21 From this perspective, unemployment could also be seen as an extreme case of under-employment with productivity equal 
to zero. Using this broad definition, unemployed population would also be included within the traditional sector. 
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By definition, the growth rate of total labour force can be derived as a weighted average of the sectoral 
growth rates of employment, with weights given by the respective shares on total employment. 
Bearing this fact in mind and assuming that total labour force grows at an exogenous rate ݊, then the 
growth rate of labour in the traditional sector can be obtained as a residual: 
 ܮ෠ௌ ൌ ݊ሺ1 െ ߣሻ െ
ߣ
ሺ1 െ ߣሻ ܮ෠ெ (20) 
Finally, since by definition output growth should be identical to the sum of productivity and 
employment growth, combining equations (19) and (20) we can get an expression for the growth rate 
of output in the traditional sector. This equation, will depend on the growth rate of employment in the 
modern sector, and thus, on the state variables of our model: 
 ෠ܻௌ ൌ ߡ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߛௌሻ ൤ ݊ሺ1 െ ߣሻ െ
ߣ
ሺ1 െ ߣሻ ܮ෠ெ൨ (21) 
As we can see, increases in the labour absorption of the modern sector might have a positive or 
negative impact on the output growth of the traditional sector depending on the magnitude of the 
decreasing returns on labour (ߛௌ). If |ߛௌ| is lower than one, then an acceleration of labour absorption in 
the modern sector will always have a negative impact on traditional output growth. If, however, these 
returns are larger than the unity (in absolute terms) then the impact will be positive: the increase of 
productivity due to the migration of workers to the modern sector more than compensate the reduction 
of labour force. The last possibility seems quite implausible, and therefore in what follows we will 
work under the assumption that |ߛௌ| ൏ 122. 
Regardless of the assumptions imposed to this parameter, what really matters is that the dynamics of 
the traditional sector will ultimately depend on the growth rate of labour in the modern sector, and 
therefore, on the state variables of our system. To understand the dynamics of the southern economy 
we need therefore to analyse the dynamical behaviour of ߩ and ߣ. 
   
                                                            
22 It is worth noting, however, that the assumptions imposed to this parameter will not have any relevant impact on the 
dynamic behaviour of the whole system. 
 21 
 
4. DYNAMICAL BEHAVIOUR 
According to the setting proposed in the previous section, the dynamic behaviour of the South will 
ultimately depend on the level of the relative stock of technological knowledge (ߩ) and the share of the 
modern sector in total employment (ߣ). Hence, to examine this behaviour, we need to analyse the 
movement in time of these state variables. Recalling their definition, 
 ߩ ൌ ெܶ
ெܶ
௙ (8) 
 ߣ ൌ ܮெܮ  (22) 
It follows that the growth rate of these variables will be given by: 
 ߩො ൌ ෠ܶெ െ ෠ܶெ௙ (23) 
 ߣመ ൌ ܮ෠ெ െ ܮ෠ (24) 
To close the system we need to specify a dynamic equation for the growth of technological knowledge 
in the leading economy ( ෠ܶெ௙). For this purpose we make use of the same specification than in the 
South, but with two important remarks: since, by definition, the technological gap of the leader equals 
zero, the "catching-up" term disappears. In addition, since in the leading economy the modern sector is 
already dominant (in an extreme case, would could assume that ߣ௙ equals one), the leader will always 
get a larger bonus for the induced innovation channel than the South (unless, of course, the South 
manages to completely catch-up with the North). Technological accumulation in the North will thus be 
given by the following expression: 
 ෠ܶெ௙ ൌ ߞ௙ ൅ ߚ௙ߣ௙ (25) 
where ߞ௙  and ߚ௙  are positive parameters capturing the domestic innovation efforts in the leading 
economy and the sensitivity of technological growth to modern sector labour share. 
Plugging equations (14), (18) and (25) into equations (23) and (24), and rearranging terms we get a 
dynamic system that describes the movements in time of our state variables: 
 ߩሶ ൌ ߩ൫݀ െ ෠ܶெ௙ െ σρ ൅ βλ൯  
ߣሶ ൌ ߣ ቈሺܾܽ ൅ ݂ොܼሻ െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ െ ݊݃݃ ൅
߰ොܼ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪ
݃ ߩ െ
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߚ ൅ ܽߠ
݃ ߣ቉  
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or, 
 ߩሶ ൌ ߩሺܣ ൅ ܤߩ ൅ ܥߣሻ (26) 
 ߣሶ ൌ ߣሺܦ ൅ ܧߩ ൅ ܨߣሻ (27) 
In the context of our model, each of these terms has an important economic meaning (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Definition and interpretation of each term in the Dynamic System 
Term Definition Economic interpretation 
ܣ ൫݀ െ ෠ܶெ௙൯ 
Growth of the relative technological knowledge due to exogenous components (domestic 
investment in R&D minus technological growth in the frontier), assuming that the South is 
benefiting from all the potential spill-over from the North. 
ܤ ሺെσሻ Deceleration in the growth rate of relative technological knowledge due to diminishing advantages of backwardness (decreasing technological gap). 
C ሺβሻ Acceleration in the growth rate of relative technological knowledge due to the modernization of the economy (increasing modern sector labour share). 
ܦ Growth of the modern sector share in total labour force due to exogenous components. These can be further divided into four terms: 
 
ܾܽ
݃  
Labour absorption due to exogenous real exchange depreciation (brought by changes in nominal 
exchange rate, foreign inflation and/or domestic “institutional” inflation). 
 ݂ መܼ݃  
Labour absorption due to increases in world income, assuming the minimum potential export 
elasticity (maximum gap-penalty on income elasticity of exports) 
െሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ݃  
Labour release due to productivity gains resulting from capital intensification and autonomous 
technological knowledge accumulation (assuming all potential spillovers). 
 ሺെ݊ሻ Deceleration of sector's share growth due to total labour force expansion. 
ܧ Acceleration in modern sector's absorption of labour due to increasing technological sophistication (decreasing technological gap). This can be further divided into two terms: 
 
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪ
݃  
Labour absorption due to productivity growth deceleration brought by diminishing advantages 
of backwardness. 
 ߰ መܼ݃  
Labour absorption due to income elasticity improvements brought by increasing technological 
sophistication of exports. 
ܨ Deceleration of labour absorption due to the modernization of the economy (increasing modern sector labour share). This can be further divided into: 
 െܽߠ݃  
Labour release due to real appreciation brought by wage-inflationary pressures. 
 െሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߚ݃  
Labour release due to productivity growth acceleration brought by the modernization of the 
economy (increasing induced-innovation). 
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4.1. Equilibrium points 
If we keep the previous assumptions that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds (ܽ ൐ 0) but weakly (so 
that ܽ ൏ ߯), and we further assume that the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect is less than one (ߛெ ൏ 1), then we 
can already determine the signs of all terms except A and D: 
 ܣ ≷ 0	; 	ܤ ൏ 0	; 	ܥ ൐ 0	; 	ܦ ≷ 0	; 	ܧ ൐ 0 ; ܨ ൏ 0  
Bearing this information in mind, we turn now to solve the system, find the potential equilibria and 
analyse their dynamic properties under different parameter conditions. 
To find the equilibrium points (steady states) of the system, we set ߩሶ ൌ 0 and ߣሶ ൌ 0 and solve for ߩ 
and ߣ. The resulting equilibrium points are detailed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Equilibrium points 
Equilibrium ࣋∗ ࣅ∗ 
ࡱ૚ ߩଵ∗ ൌ 0 ߣଵ∗ ൌ 0 
ࡱ૛ ߩଶ∗ ൌ െܣܤ ߣଶ∗ ൌ 0 
ࡱ૜ ߩଷ∗ ൌ 0 ߣଷ∗ ൌ െܦܨ  
ࡱ૝ ߩସ∗ ൌ ܥܦ െ ܣܨܤܨ െ ܥܧ ߣସ∗ ൌ
ܣܧ െ ܤܦ
ܤܨ െ ܥܧ  
 
The last equilibrium is the most interesting. Graphically, this equilibrium is reached in the intersection 
of the isoclines for which ߩሶ ൌ 0 and ߣሶ ൌ 0. That is, the intersection of:  
 ߣ ൌ െܣܥ െ
ܤ
ܥ ߩ ሺߩሶ ൌ 0ሻ 
 ߣ ൌ െܦܨ െ
ܧ
ܨ ߩ ൫ߣሶ ൌ 0൯ 
The remaining equilibria would typically be characterized as being non-meaningful in economic terms 
and therefore, ignored. In the context of our model, however, these equilibria are also interesting 
because they can be associated with different stages in the development process. The first equilibrium, 
for example, would represent a low-income trap, in which the modern sector does not exist and the 
stock of domestic technological knowledge is negligible as compared with the advanced world. The 
other two equilibria would represent intermediate stages in which either there is some accumulation of 
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technological knowledge that has not yet given rise to a modern exporting sector (ܧଶ) or there is a 
modern exporting sector that uses technologies that are extremely far from the leading economy (ܧଷ). 
In graphical terms, ܧଵ is the origin while ܧଶ is the x-intercept of ߩሶ ൌ 0 and ܧଷ is the y-intercept of 
ߣሶ ൌ 0 (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the Equilibria 
 
In what follows, our analysis will focus on the Equilibrium 4, but looking at the dynamic properties of 
all the equilibria taken together. 
Before entering in the dynamic analysis, we need to establish a set of conditions that ensures the 
economic viability of Equilibrium 4. By definition, ߩ and ߣ should be positive and less or equal than 
one. Therefore, we need to impose four “viability conditions”: 
 
Table 3. Viability Conditions 
Condition  
VC 1 ߩସ∗ ൐ 0 
VC 2 ߣସ∗ ൐ 0 
VC 3 ߩସ∗ ൑ 1 
VC 4 ߣସ∗ ൑ 1 
 
ρ(dot)=0
λ(dot)=0
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The first two viability conditions will be met if and only if the numerator and denominator of ߩସ∗ and 
ߣସ∗  have the same sign. VC3 and VC4, instead, require that the absolute value of the denominator is 
larger than the absolute value of the numerator. 
In the mathematical appendix we demonstrate that, given the signs of the terms that are already know, 
these conditions can be met under six different set of restrictions. Each set is defined by a different 
combination in the sings of the terms A and D and the sign of the slope differential between the 
equilibrium curves. The following table summarizes these sets and the particular conditions needed: 
 
Table 4. Viability Conditions under different restrictions on the signs of A, D and the slope differential 
Sub-Cases Viability Conditions 
 ܣ ܦ  (slopes)       
  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0   VC1  VC2  VC3  VC4  
Case 1.1: + +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   n.a.   n.a.   ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൒ ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ  ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൒ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ  
Case 1.2:  + -  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൐ 0   ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൐ 0   ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൒ ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ  ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൒ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ  
Case 1.3:  - +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൐ 0   ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൐ 0   ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൒ ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ  ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൒ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ  
Case 2.1: - -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   n.a.   n.a.   ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൑ ܥܦ െ ܣܨ  ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൑ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ  
Case 2.2:  + -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൏ 0   ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൏ 0   ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൑ ܥܦ െ ܣܨ  ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൑ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ  
Case 2.3:  - +  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൏ 0   ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൏ 0   ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൑ ܥܦ െ ܣܨ  ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൑ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ  
 
In the table we distinguish two broad groups. In the first group (Case 1), the slope of ߩሶ ൌ 0 is larger 
than the slope of ߣሶ ൌ 0 (as in the example presented in Figure 1). Within this group three further sub-
cases are detailed according to different combinations in the sign of the terms A and D for which the 
viability conditions can be met23. In the second group, instead, the slope of ߣሶ ൌ 0 is larger. The sub-
cases again distinguish different combinations for the signs of A and D. 
The following figure illustrates each of these cases: 
 
                                                            
23 Notice that in this case a scenario in which the terms A and D are simultaneously negative could never satisfy the viability 
conditions and thus it is not included in the table. 
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of the different cases 
Case 1.1 
 
Case 2.1 
 
Case 1.2 
 
Case 2.2 
 
Case 1.3 
 
Case 2.3 
 
 
4.2. Dynamic Properties 
We turn now to analyse the stability properties of each equilibrium under the different sets of 
restrictions defined in Table 4. Interestingly, if the viability conditions are met, it can be shown that 
the stability of the fourth equilibrium will only depend on the sign of the slope differential. If the slope 
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of ߩሶ ൌ 0 is larger than the slope of ߣሶ ൌ 0 (Case 1), then the equilibrium will be stable. Otherwise, it 
will be a saddle point24. 
The remaining equilibria will never be stable when Equilibrium 4 is stable. If this equilibrium is not 
stable, however, at least one of the remaining equilibria will be stable. In particular, in Case 2.1, the 
first equilibrium will be stable, in Case 2.2 the second equilibrium will be stable and in Case 2.3, the 
third equilibrium will be stable25. The following table summarizes these results: 
 
Table 5. Stability properties of the Equilibria under different cases 
Sub-Cases Equilibria 
 ܣ ܦ  (slopes)       
  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0   Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4  
Case 1.1: + +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   Unstable   Saddle   Saddle   Stable  
Case 1.2:  + -  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   Saddle   Saddle   Unstable   Stable   
Case 1.3:  - +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   Saddle   Unstable   Saddle   Stable   
Case 2.1: - -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   Stable   Saddle   Saddle   Saddle   
Case 2.2:  + -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   Saddle   Stable   Saddle   Saddle   
Case 2.3:  - +  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   Saddle   Saddle   Stable   Saddle   
 
Another feature worth noting about Table 5 is that in the majority of the cases the non-stable equilibria 
are actually saddle points. That is, points that exhibit both stability and instability at the same time. In 
the vicinity of these points there are trajectories moving towards and away from them. However, there 
is only one trajectory that will lead the economy to that steady state. All other trajectories, even if they 
move towards that attractor for some time, will eventually turn and move away. The fact that 
Equilibrium 4 constitutes a saddle point in Case 2 (see last column of Table 5) is therefore quite 
interesting from policy perspective. It means that there might be a feasible trajectory to the good 
equilibrium but it is very difficult to hit it. This contrast with the Case 1, in which reaching the good 
equilibrium is much easier: it just requires that the economy moves out from the basis of attraction of 
the other low-income traps. The following figure illustrates these contrasting situations. 
                                                            
24 See Mathematical Appendix 8.1 for the formal demonstration. 
25 See Mathematical Appendix 8.2 for the formal demonstration. 
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Figure 3. Illustrative trajectories under different stability properties in Equilibrium 4 
A) Saddle Point B) Stable Equilibrium 
 
Panel A on Figure 3 illustrates a situation in which the Equilibrium 4 is a saddle point (Case 2.1). 
Besides the regular isoclines (equations for which the movement of the state variables is zero), the 
figure also shows the so-called separatrices (dotted lines). These lines, which also pass through the 
steady-state, determine the direction of any trajectory moving in the vicinity of the equilibrium. One of 
them (the stable arm) has arrows pointing towards the equilibrium, while the other (the unstable arms) 
is pointing away from it. Due to these counterbalancing forces, the only way to reach the steady state 
is to be posited exactly on the stable arm. Any initial condition not situated in this arm, will lead the 
economy away from the steady state. This is illustrated in the figure by the trajectories starting in 
points a and b. As we can see, after initially heading towards the steady state, these trajectories bend 
and move towards the origin. The trajectory starting at the initial conditions depicted by point e, 
instead, manages to move smoothly towards the steady state. From a policy point of view, this would 
mean that if the economy starts with a very small modern sector (as represented, for example, in points 
b and e) and the good equilibrium is a saddle point, this equilibrium will only be reachable if the 
technological gap is extremely low. Specifically, for a modern sector that employs only 10 per cent of 
the labour force, the relative technological knowledge should be exactly 95 per cent of that of the 
leading economy in order to hit the stable path towards the equilibrium. Anything smaller will lead the 
economy towards a low-income poverty trap (as shown by the path starting in b). 
In clear contrast, Panel B presents a situation in which the Equilibrium 4 is stable (Case 1.1). In such a 
case, regardless of the initial conditions the economy will always head towards the steady state. We 
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can see, therefore, that in this case the trajectories starting with the initial conditions a and b will also 
move towards the steady state, significantly reducing the technological gap (trajectory starting in a) or 
expanding the share of the modern sector (trajectory starting in b). 
4.3. Economic Interpretation 
We focus now on the economic meaning of the various conditions that determine the different cases 
detailed in the previous section. These cases result from different combinations in the signs of the 
slope differential and the terms A and D. Recalling the definition of B, C, E and F (see Table 1), it is 
possible to see that the sign of the slope differential will be determined by the following expression: 
 ൬െܤܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰ ൌ
ሺܽߠߪ െ ߚ߰ොܼሻ
ߚሾߙߚሺ߯ െ ܽሻ ൅ ܽߠሿ  
Under the assumption that ߯ ൐ ܽ  the denominator will always be positive and the sign of the 
expression will ultimately be determined by the numerator. This means that Equilibrium 4 will be 
stable (Case 1) if and only if: 
 ܽߠߪ ൐ ߚ߰ොܼ  
If this condition does not hold, then the equilibrium will be a saddle point (Case 2). 
In order to get a better understanding of the economic meaning of this condition, we can re-write it as 
follows: 
 
ߪ
ߚ ൐
߰ොܼ
ܽߠ ⇒
ሺെߪሻ
ߚ ൏
߰ොܼ
ሺെܽߠሻ  
We can notice that the terms on the left-hand-side are related to the growth rate of technological 
knowledge, while the terms in the right-hand-side are related to the growth rate of output in the 
modern sector. In particular, ሺെߪሻ captures the negative impact of the relative stock of technological 
knowledge (ߩ) on the growth rate of technological knowledge (due to decreasing advantages of 
backwardness as the gap is reduced) and ߚ captures the positive impact of the share of the modern 
sector (ߣ) on the growth rate of technological knowledge (the induced-innovation channel). On the 
other side, ߰ොܼ reflects the “direct” positive impact of the relative stock of technological knowledge (ߩ) 
on the growth rate of output in the modern sector26 and ሺെܽߠሻ captures the "direct" negative impact of 
                                                            
26 That is, without considering the “indirect” impact of ߩ on output growth through relative-price changes brought by its 
effects on productivity growth. 
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the share of the modern sector (ߣ) on the growth rate of output in the modern sector due to wage-
inflation27. 
In the light of these definitions, we can see that the condition is actually stating that the (direct) effect 
of ߩ  as compared to the (direct) effect of ߣ  should be larger in the growth rate of technological 
knowledge than in the growth rate of output. This will always be the case if in each equation ( ෠ܻெ and 
෠ܶெ) the negative effect prevails. That is, if: 
 ߪ ൐ ߚ		 ∧ 		ܽߠ ൐ ߰ොܼ  
For this to happen, we need that the coefficients ߪ and ܽ (combined with ߠ) are sufficiently large. 
Both coefficients play a key role in our model. The first one is capturing the scope by which the South 
can benefit from international technological spillovers (either in the form of technological transfer or 
directly via imitation). Since the absorptive capabilities of the South are not explicitly modelled in our 
technological knowledge equation (as it would be the case, for example, if we use a non-linear 
specification for the spillovers in line with Verspagen (1991), (1993)), these capabilities would be 
implicitly captured by ߪ. Increasing absorptive capacity would then increase ߪ and thus contribute to 
the stability of Equilibrium 4. 
The coefficient ܽ , on the other hand, is representing the so-called Marshal-Lerner condition, and 
therefore is capturing the cumulative effects of changes in the real exchange rate on competitiveness 
and long-run growth. We can see that the larger the size of this coefficient, the more likely that the 
equilibrium will be stable. In an extreme case (that we might call "strong Marshal-Lerner"), it is 
possible to show that if ܽ is larger than ߯ and the difference ሺܽ െ ߯ሻ is larger than ሺ߰ොܼ ߙߪ⁄ ሻ, then the 
slope of ߣሶ ൌ 0 will be negative and the fourth equilibrium will always be stable. However, a strong 
Marshal-Lerner condition seems to be against most findings in the literature28 and therefore we will 
keep the assumption that ܽ is positive but smaller than ߯. 
We turn now to analyse the distinction between the sub-cases (1, 2 and 3). As we have already shown, 
each sub-case will depend on the particular sign of A and D. 
Recalling the definition of A (see Table 1), we can see that this term will be positive if and only if: 
 ݀ ൐ ݄ ⇒	 ሺߞ ൅ ߪሻ ൐ ൫ߞ௙ ൅ ߚ௙ߣ௙൯  
                                                            
27 That is, without considering the “indirect” impact of ߣ on output growth through relative-price changes brought by its 
effects on productivity growth. 
28 See footnote 19. 
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Bearing in mind that ߞ௙ (R&D investment in the leading economy) will be typically larger than ߞ, and 
that ߣ௙ will be typically close to one, it is possible to assume that A will always be negative at early 
stages of development. Only an extremely high value for ߪ could revert this situation (which would 
require, as we mentioned before, very high levels of domestic absorptive capacities). 
The term D, on the other hand, will be positive if: 
 
൫ܾܽ ൅ ݂ መܼ൯ ൐ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺߤ݇ ൅ ߙ݀ሻ ൅ ݊݃ ⇒ 
ܾܽ ൅ ሺߦ െ ߰ሻොܼ ൐ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻሾߤ݇ ൅ ߙሺߞ ൅ ߪሻሿ ൅ ݊ൣ߯ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛܯ൧ 
 
That is, it will be positive if the autonomous forces leading to labour absorption in the modern sector 
(exogenous real depreciation and world income growth) more than compensate the autonomous forces 
leading to labour release (productivity gains resulting from capital intensification and exogenous 
technological accumulation) and the increase in total labour force. 
At initial stages of development, D will typically be negative due to the combined effect of high 
population growth (݊) and low income elasticity of demand for exports with poor technological 
sophistication (ߦ െ ߰). As a country develops, D will typically turn sign and become positive because 
the negative effect of ݊  diminishes while the effects of capital intensification and exogenous 
technological accumulation remain low. At a certain stage of development, however, D might turn 
sign again: if domestic investments in capital and R&D rise significantly and/or absorptive capabilities 
are significantly improved, while income elasticity remain low (or increase less rapidly), D will 
become negative again. 
As we will see in the next section, the correspondences that can be done between the signs of A and D 
and the different stages of development will be very useful in understanding, from an economic point 
of view, the dynamical behaviour of the model proposed. 
To finish the characterization of the equilibria in the model, we state now the four viability conditions 
in terms of A, D and the deep parameters of the model: 
 ߚ݃ܦ ൅ ሾܽߠ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߚሿܣ ൐ 0 (VC 1) 
 ߚሾ݃ܦ െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪ െ ߰ොܼሿ ൅ ሾܽߠ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߚሿሺܣ െ ߪሻ ൑ 0 (VC 3) 
 ߪ݃ܦ ൅ ሾ߰ොܼ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪሿܣ ൐ 0 (VC 2) 
 ߪሾ݃ܦ െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪ െ ܽߠሿ ൅ ሾ߰ොܼ ൅ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߙߪሿሺܣ െ ߚሻ ൑ 0 (VC 4) 
As we can see, the viability conditions are actually imposing some lower and upper boundaries to the 
relative sizes of the terms A and D. 
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5. TRAJECTORIES AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT TRAPS 
5.1. Structural Trajectories 
An interesting feature of the model proposed in this paper is that it is able to reproduce, in a very 
simplified fashion, different structural trajectories which are in line with a long strand of appreciative 
theorizing on economic development. In order to exploit this feature, we present now a series of 
simulations that, based on the system form by equations (26) and (27), can illustrate this sort of 
trajectories and provide some intuition on the general conditions that need to be met in order to 
achieve success in the process of economic development. 
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the various scenarios defined before by looking at the 
signs of A, D and the slope differential (Cases 1.1 to 2.3) can actually be associated with different 
stages of development, and the multiple equilibria of the model can be associated with different sorts 
of low-income traps that need to be overcome before entering in a successful path towards economic 
development. That is, a path in which the economy manages to achieve structural modernization and, 
at the same time, reduce significantly the technological gap. 
At very early stages of development, the economy would be dominated by the traditional sector and 
the stock of technological knowledge would be negligible when compared with the advanced world. In 
terms of our model, the economy would be situated very close to the basin of attraction of Equilibrium 
1 and, eventually, it will end up in a poverty trap where ߩ and ߣ will be equal to zero. This equilibrium 
would be stable and therefore the economy will tend to stay in this trap unless an exogenous shock 
changes some of the underlying parameters that describe the functioning of the economy. As we have 
previously seen, Equilibrium 1 will be stable if and only if the terms A and D are simultaneously 
negative. Such a situation can be represented as follows: 
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Figure 4. Initial Stage 
 
a = 0.8; b = 0.01; ෠ܶெ௙ = 0.04; k = 0; n = 0.02; መܼ  = 0.05; ߙ = 0.34; ߚ = 0.04;  
ߛ = 0.4; ߞ = 0; ߠ = 0.065; ߤ = 0.15; ߦ = 0.8; ߪ = 0.01; ߯ = 1.25; ߰ = 0.8 
 
This figure present the usual isoclines in the space (ߩ ; ߣ) and the corresponding relevant equilibrium. 
In addition, it shows the slope field of the system. That is, the direction of all possible trajectories 
starting from any point in the bi-dimensional plane of the state variables. This field provides a 
straightforward rule to determine the stability of the various equilibria: if an equilibrium is stable, then 
in the vicinity of that equilibrium all arrows should point towards it (as in Equilibrium 1 in Figure 4). 
Below the figure we also detail the specific parameter-values used to build it.29 
Under this particular set of parameters, the model illustrates an economy that –at initial levels of 
technological development– has no foreign demand for its product (ߦ ൌ ߰  and thus the income 
elasticity for exports is zero). In such a situation, regardless of how fast the world income is increasing 
(in the simulation we assume an increase of 5 per cent) the term D will probably be negative. 
Therefore, the absence of enough external demand will make the existence of a modern sector 
nonviable. Furthermore, by being at very initial stages of technological development the difference 
between the autonomous increase in domestic and foreign technology will be so large that the term A 
will be negative as well. In such a situation (terms A and D being simultaneously negative and the 
slope differential also being negative) the first equilibrium will be stable and regardless of the initial 
conditions the economy will end up in this poverty trap. 
                                                            
29 All the figures presented in this section have been calculated using Wolfrand Mathematica 8.0. The software scripts are 
available upon request. 
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To escape from this equilibrium either A and/or D should become positive. That is, either the domestic 
investments on technological accumulation and the absorptive capacity of the economy should raise 
enough to surpass the technological growth of the North (thus turning positive the term A) and/or the 
autonomous forces leading to labour absorption in the modern sector should raise up to the point that 
they more than counterbalance the exogenous growth of total labour force (which would turn positive 
the term D). If the intensity of these changes is not as strong as to revert the instability of the good 
equilibrium, the economy will end up in an intermediate equilibrium that might also be associated with 
a low (or medium)-income trap. In the first case (increase in domestic technological capabilities) the 
economy will move towards the Equilibrium 2 (ߩଶ∗ ൐ 0; ߣଶ∗ ൌ 0): the traditional sector will continue to 
be dominant, but the technological gap will be reduced. In the second case, the economy will move 
towards the Equilibrium 3 (ߩଷ∗ ൌ 0; ߣଷ∗ ൐ 0 ): a modern exporting sector will emerge, but using 
obsolete technologies in international terms. The following figures illustrate each of these scenarios30. 
 
Figure 5. Big-Push on technological investments 
 
a = 0.8; b = 0.01; ෠ܶெ௙ = 0.04; k = 0; n = 0.01; መܼ  = 0.05; ߙ = 0.34; ߚ = 0.04;  
ߛ = 0.4; ߞ = 0.02; ߠ = 0.065; ߤ = 0.15; ߦ = 0.8; ߪ = 0.02; ߯ = 1.25; ߰ = 0.8 
 
 
                                                            
30 In each figure, the parameters that have changed with respect to the previous situation are underlined. 
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Figure 6. Emergence of a modern exporting sector 
 
a = 0.8; b = 0.01; ෠ܶெ௙ = 0.04; k = 0; n = 0.01; መܼ  = 0.05; ߙ = 0.34; ߚ = 0.04;  
ߛ = 0.4; ߞ = 0; ߠ = 0.065; ߤ = 0.15; ߦ = 1.3; ߪ = 0.01; ߯ = 1.25; ߰ = 0.8 
 
Starting from the set of parameters that defined Figure 4, in Figure 5 we have simulated a 
simultaneous increase of ߞ and ߪ (a "big-push" on technological investments) and a decrease in ݊ (the 
well-known decrease in population growth that goes hand to hand with economic development). In 
Figure 6, instead, we have simulated an increase of ߦ (the autonomous income demand elasticity for 
exports) together with the decrease of ݊. 
From these potential trajectories, the most reasonable would be the one represented by Figure 6. This 
trajectory is actually quite in line with the historical path followed by many developing countries, in 
which the emergence of a modern sector was typically associated with an exogenous shock that 
provided an export opportunity for the domestic production (in terms of our model, an increase in ߦ so 
that, ߦ ൐ ߰)31. Other things equal, such an event will move the curve ߣሶ ൌ 0  upwards eventually 
turning positive the sign of the term D (and thus the y-intercept of this curve, as shown in Figure 6). 
This force might also be reinforced by a decrease in the growth rate of total labour force. Both factors 
will lead to an increasing participation of the modern sector in the absorption of total labour. At early 
                                                            
31 Think, for example, in the experience of the East and Southeast Asian economies during the post-war period. Geostrategic 
events (as Richard Stubbs put its) significantly helped these economies to find markets for their emerging manufacturing 
industries. The Korean war gave a huge boost to Japan’s and Hong Kong’s exports and, later, the Vietnam war boosted the 
sales of emerging manufacturing exports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Stubbs (1999), (2005)). In terms 
of our model, these exogenous shocks would have given new export opportunities that, in turn, boosted the emergence and 
consolidation of a modern exporting sector. 
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phases of this process, however, it is not surprising that the technology at use is obsolete in 
international terms, as compared with the world frontier.  
The other case, instead, could be associated with a "big-push" in technological investments that 
succeeds in reducing the technological gap. This push, however, is unable to translate the increasing 
technological capabilities into the creation of a dynamic modern sector. In a way, demand factors 
(mainly related to a low income elasticity of exports) play against the final outcome of this trajectory. 
In terms of the figure, this is represented by a movement downwards of the curve ߩሶ ൌ 0, up to a point 
in which A becomes positive (and thus the x-intercept of this curve). We can notice now the 
emergence of a stable equilibrium (the Equilibrium 2 in our previous discussion) on the horizontal 
axis. 
Once the economy reaches any of these intermediate equilibria, the challenge becomes different. To 
escape this sort of poverty (or middle)-income traps, the role of absorptive capacities and export 
performance become fundamental. If, for example, the economy manages to significantly increase the 
domestic absorptive capacity (or move towards sectors where imitation is easier) and at the same time 
increases the share of exportable goods with lower gap-punishment on demand (that is, goods with 
high income-elasticity of demand regardless of the degree of technological sophistication), then it 
might enter into a dynamic path towards the good equilibrium. This process will typically take place 
together with an intensification of the capital-output ratio (݇) and an increase in R&D expenditures (ߞ) 
that will lead to higher productivity gains and –ceteris paribus– would decrease the capacity of the 
modern sector to absorb labour. Therefore, the increase in exports should be large enough to more than 
compensate this negative impact in labour absorption. 
In terms of our model, starting from Figure 6, this story could be reflected as a simultaneous increase 
in ߪ  (which would be associated with an increase in the domestic absorptive capacity), ݇  and ߞ 
together with a decrease in ߰ (the gap-punishment on income elasticity of exports). Figure 7 shows 
this new scenario. 
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Figure 7. Path towards successful development 
 
a = 0.8; b = 0.01; ෠ܶெ௙ = 0.04; k = 0.25; n = 0.01; መܼ  = 0.05; ߙ = 0.34; ߚ = 0.04;  
ߛ = 0.4; ߞ = 0.005; ߠ = 0.065; ߤ = 0.15; ߦ = 1.3; ߪ = 0.08; ߯ = 1.25; ߰ = 0.4 
 
As we can see from Figure 7, if there are no further changes in the parameters, the economy will move 
towards a good equilibrium, in which the modern sector becomes dominant (ߣ ൌ 0.64) and the 
technological gap is significantly reduced (ߩ ൌ 0.88). It follows that the structural trajectory described 
by the transition from Figure 4 to Figure 6 and then to Figure 7 can be characterized as a story of 
successful development. Such a trajectory would schematically illustrate the experience of the East 
and Southeast Asian economies. As it has been extensively documented by the literature, during the 
post-war period these economies managed to improve significantly their absorptive capacities and 
increase their stock of technological knowledge32. In parallel –and perhaps more importantly– they 
also managed to transform they economic structures towards the production of goods with higher 
degrees of technological sophistication and higher income-elasticity of demand in world markets33. 
That is, they managed to simultaneously achieve a significant increase of ߪ and a reduction of ߰. In 
the light of our model, these transformations would have been at the core of their successful 
developmental path.  
                                                            
32 See for example Cimoli et al. (2009); Hobday (1995); Kim and Nelson (2000) 
33 Gouvea and Lima (2010) provide interesting evidence in this regard. Using a multi-sectoral BOPC model they show that 
the acceleration of growth in the Asian tigers (as compared to Latin America) was primarily due to their increasing 
specialization in those goods for which the income-elasticity of exports was higher. 
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Once the economy manages to undertake the specific transformations needed to ensure the stability of 
Equilibrium 4, the particular attractor towards which it moves will depend on the specific values of the 
remaining parameters. Hence, it is important to examine how marginal changes in these parameters 
will impact on the equilibrium values of the state variables. 
5.2. Comparative statics 
The following table summarizes the impact that changes in the deep parameters of the model would 
have on the equilibrium values of the state variables in the vicinity of Equilibrium 4 (assuming that it 
is stable and economically viable). It presents the sign of the partial derivative of ߩସ∗  and ߣସ∗  with 
respect to each parameter of the model. Marginal increases of parameters that present a positive 
(negative) sign will improve (harm) the steady state of the Southern economy. 
 
Table 6. Comparative Statics in the vicinity of Equilibrium 4 (sign of the partial 
derivatives of ࣋૝∗  and ࣅ૝∗  with respect to the deep parameters of the model). 
Parameter ࣋૝∗  ࣅ૝∗  
ܽ ? (+) ? (+) 
ܾ + + 
෠ܶெ௙ - - 
݇  - - 
݊ - - 
መܼ + + 
ߙ - - 
ߚ ? (+) + 
ߛ - - 
ߞ + + 
ߠ - - 
ߤ	 - - 
ߦ + + 
ߪ + ? (+) 
߯ - - 
߰ - ? (-) 
Note: The interrogation mark identifies those cases in which the sign of the derivative is undetermined 
under the assumptions already defined throughout the model. Between brackets it is specified the sign that 
these derivatives will take under some additional conditions. See Appendix 8.3 for further details. 
 
Looking at the table, the first feature that stands out is the homogeneity of signs between the state 
variable. Under the setting proposed, the impact of marginal changes in the parameters will typically 
 39 
 
go in the same direction both for ߩସ∗ and ߣସ∗ . Only in very few cases, changes in the values of one 
parameter might have an opposite impact on the equilibrium values of the state variables34. In general 
terms, all signs are in line with the intuition and the literature on this topic. Increases in the size of the 
Marshall-Lerner condition ሺܽሻ, the exogenous rate of currency depreciation ሺܾሻ, the growth rate of 
foreign income ൫ መܼ൯ and the autonomous part of the income elasticity ሺߦሻ will all have a positive effect 
on the growth rate of output and, through this demand channel, on the equilibrium values of the state 
variables. Improvements on domestic absorptive capacities ሺߪሻ, local investments in R&D ሺߞሻ and the 
size of the induced innovation coefficient ሺߚሻ would also have a positive impact on the equilibrium 
values, in this case, through their direct effect on the rate of accumulation of technological knowledge 
and their indirect effect on competitiveness and export demand. 
Increases in the remaining parameters would have negative impact on the equilibrium values. Higher 
income elasticity for imports ሺ߯ሻ would erode the net effects of any force that increases output, thus 
diminishing labour absorption and technological accumulation in the modern sector. Higher values in 
the invest-output ratio ሺ݇ሻ, or the sensitivity of productivity to captialization ሺߤሻ , in turn, would 
accelerate productivity gains and lower the rates of labour absorption in the modern sector, decreasing 
the equilibrium values of ߩସ∗ and ߣସ∗ . The same is true for the dynamic returns to scale parameter ሺߛெሻ 
and the sensitivity of productivity gains to the technological stock growth ሺߙሻ. 
Higher levels of technological accumulation in the leading economy ൫ ෠ܶெ௙൯ and rapid growth of the total 
labour force ሺ݊ሻ would also tend to diminish the equilibrium values, due to their respectively negative 
effects on the relative technological stock and the share of the modern sector in total employment. In a 
similar vein, higher sensitivity of wages in the modern sector to the size of the reserve army ሺߠሻ would 
erode price-competitiveness of exports more rapidly and thus impact negatively on the equilibrium. 
Finally, a higher penalty to technological backwardness in the export elasticity ሺ߰ሻ  will tend to 
diminish the demand for exports and therefore would also have a negative impact on the equilibrium 
values. 
In the cases of ܽ,	ߚ, ߪ, and ߰ it is important to notice that the direction of the effects might not always 
be as described above. In the appendix we detail the specific additional conditions needed to get this 
particular impact. In most cases, these conditions are not very restrictive and thus likely to hold. 
The effect of marginal changes in the deep parameters of the model can be illustrated by looking at 
two phenomena that have attracted special attention in the economic development literature in recent 
years: the acceleration of global technological change and the movements in the real exchange rates.  
                                                            
34 These would be the cases in which the additional conditions for ܽ and	ߚ (in the case of ߩସ∗) and ߪ and ߰ (in the case of ߣସ∗ ) 
are not met. See Appendix 8.3 for the details. 
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Figure 8 present the case of a developing economy that, starting from an equilibrium position, face 
simultaneously an acceleration of technological change in the global economy (modelled as an 
increase in the technological knowledge growth rate of the leading economy, ෠ܶெ௙) and an acceleration 
of the rate of real appreciation of its domestic currency (modelled as a reduction of ܾ, that could either 
respond to an increase in the rate of autonomous inflation, ߱, or a reduction in the rate of nominal 
depreciation, ݁̂). Other things equal, the first phenomena will make the term A fall and this will be 
reflected by a movement to the left of the ߩ-isocline. In addition, the real appreciation would decrese 
the term D and therefore the ߣ-isocline will move downwards, as shown in the figure. The result of 
this two combined effect will be extremely harmful for the Southern economy. As we can see, the new 
equilibrium E4’ will entail a significantly lower share of labour in the modern sector and a much wider 
technological gap. 
Figure 8. Acceleration of global technological change 
and real appreciation of the domestic currency 
 
A trajectory as the one presented in Figure 8 could be associated, for example, to the experience of 
Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s where various episodes of strong real appreciation of 
domestic currencies (due to high inflation or stabilization policies anchored on appreciated nominal 
exchange rates) together with a failure to tap into the global acceleration of technological growth 
brought by the ICT-revolution, dramatically hampered the possibility of these countries to sustain a 
process of structural modernization and technological catching up.  
E4
E4'
ρ(dot)'=0
λ(dot)'=0
ρ(dot)=0
λ(dot)=0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
λ
ρ
 41 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STEPS 
The productive absorption of labour has been long identified as one of the major challenges of 
developing economies. From the development pioneers back in the post-war period to the flagship 
publications of major international organization nowadays, this has been and continues being in the 
centre of the development agenda. 
Despite its centrality, this issue has not been fully acknowledged in theoretical research about the 
sources and dynamics of economic growth. This paper tried to make a modest contribution in this line 
by setting up a model of catching up among nations in which the dual character of developing 
economies and the important challenges to absorb labour in the modern part of the economy stands out 
as one of the major features. By examining the dynamic interaction between technological catching-up 
and structural modernization, the model provides interesting insights on the different structural 
trajectories that an economy might follow in the process of economic development. Furthermore, it is 
able to deliver economically meaningful multiple equilibria in a simple linear setting. Hence, it can be 
easily solved and yields clear traceability of the main forces involved.  
Interestingly, the multiple equilibria of the model can be associated with different types of low-income 
traps that need to be overcome in order to enter in a path towards successful development. Simple 
simulations of the model illustrated this feature. After surpassing an initial poverty trap –whether due 
to the emergence of a modern exporting activity or due to some boost in the domestic technological 
capabilities– the Southern economy would typically be attracted towards another bad steady state. In 
order to rectify this tendency, two fundamental transformations would be needed: a radical 
improvement in the export performance and a radical enhancement in the domestic absorptive 
capabilities. Failure to achieve any of these transformations will ultimately lead the developing 
economy to one of the remaining underdevelopment traps. 
It remains open, however, the question about how exactly these transformation take place. The 
successful experience of East and Southeast Asian economies seems to suggest that a key element in 
this process is the upgrading of the modern sector towards the production of goods with higher degrees 
of technological sophistication and higher income-elasticity of demand in world markets. In the 
simplified framework proposed here this sort of dynamics could not be explicitly modelled. For this 
reason, an interesting extension of the model would lie in the introduction of a multi-sectoral structure 
within the modern sector of the Southern economy. Such an extension could shed new light in this 
issue and improve the analytical interpretation of the major results of the model. One way to do so 
would be to model the modern sector as producing a continuum of goods with different technological 
characteristics, as it is done, for example, in Cimoli and Porcile (2013). Alternatively, the modern 
sector could be modelled using a dynamic Input-Output framework, in line, for example, with Los and 
Verspagen (2006). 
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A second line in which the model could be extended would be the inclusion of non-linearities in some 
of its building functional relations. This could significantly improve its capability to depict more 
closely the reality of certain economic phenomena. One step in this line would consist in introducing a 
non-linear specification for the international spillovers in the equation of technological knowledge 
accumulation. Following Verspagen (1991) and (1993), such a setting would capture better the ideas 
of the original catching-up theorists. Under this setting, the specific role of absorptive capacities and 
technological congruence at different stages of development could be fully explored. Preliminary 
simulations in this line give a richer set of possible outcomes when it comes to analyse the structural 
trajectories followed by the domestic economies. In particular, a non-zero low-level equilibrium also 
emerge, which might very well depict the reality of emerging economies that have been trapped at 
middle-income levels. 
Another step in this line would be the introduction of a retardation mechanism in the Kaldor-Verdoorn 
coefficient according to which the size of this parameter would decrease as the economy develops. 
This is the approach used in Rada (2007), where the K-V coefficient depends (in a non-linear fashion) 
on the share of the modern sector in total employment. Such a setting would yield a more realistic 
pattern in the growth rate of output as countries become richer. If this coefficient diminishes with the 
size of the modern sector share, then more advanced economies would have a lower premium in terms 
of increasing returns to scale and –other things equal– a lower rate of output growth.  
It follows that the model proposed can provide a well suited starting point for future research. As we 
have briefly detailed, some interesting extensions can be built upon the ground set by this model. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that extending the model in any of these lines will significantly 
increase its complexity and reduce the intuitive traceability of the main forces involved, which has 
been one of the major concerns of this paper. 
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8. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
8.1. Viability Conditions 
In this appendix we derive the particular restrictions that need to be imposed to the parameters of the 
model in order to get a viable equilibrium with non-zero values for the state variables. That is, an 
equilibrium in which the four viability conditions defined in Section 4.1 are simultaneously satisfied.  
As we have previously stated, VC1 and VC2 will be satisfied if and only if the numerator and 
denominator of ߩସ∗ and ߣସ∗  are simultaneously positive or negative. That is:  
 
Table A 1. Cases in which VC1 and VC2 are satisfied 
Condition CASE 1 CASE 2 
VC 1:	ߩସ∗ ൐ 0 ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൐ 0 ∧ ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൐ 0 ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൏ 0	 ∧ 	ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൏ 0 
VC 2:	ߣସ∗ ൐ 0 ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൐ 0 ∧ ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൐ 0 ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൏ 0	 ∧ 	ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൏ 0 
 
Regardless of the signs, VC3 and VC4 will be satisfied if and only if the absolute value of the 
denominator is larger or equal than the absolute value of the numerator. That is: 
 
Table A 2. Cases in which VC3 and VC4 are satisfied 
Condition CASE 1 and 2 
VC 3:	ߩସ∗ ൑ 1 |ܤܨ െ ܥܧ| ൒ |ܥܦ െ ܣܨ| 
VC 4:	ߣସ∗ ൑ 1 |ܤܨ െ ܥܧ| ൒ |ܣܧ െ ܤܦ| 
 
Given that VC1 and VC2 can be satisfied under two sets of different conditions, we need to analyse 
each of them separately. 
8.1.1. Case 1: positive denominator in Equilibrium 4 
To satisfy VC1 and VC2 we need that ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ and ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ are simultaneously positive. 
Bearing in mind that ܤ ൏ 0, ܥ ൐ 0, ܧ ൐ 0 and ܨ ൏ 0, this will never happen if ܣ ൏ 0 and ܦ ൏ 0 . By 
the same token, both conditions will always hold if ܣ ൐ 0 and ܦ ൐ 0. If only one of this terms is 
negative (either ܣ or ܦ) then we need to explicitly specify the conditions stated before. 
The following table summarizes the conditions needed in each sub-case: 
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Table A 3. VC1 and VC2 in Case 1 
Sub-Cases VC 1 VC 2 
Case 1.1:	ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൐ 0	 ∧ 	ܣ ൐ 0 ∧ ܦ ൐ 0  n.a. n.a. 
Case 1.2:	ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൐ 0	 ∧ 	ܣ ൐ 0 ∧ ܦ ൏ 0  ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൐ 0 ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൐ 0 
Case 1.3:	ሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ ൐ 0	 ∧ 	ܣ ൏ 0 ∧ ܦ ൐ 0  ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൐ 0 ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ ൐ 0 
 
To grasp the intuition behind these conditions, it is interesting to re-express them in terms of the slopes 
and intercepts of the system form by the equilibrium curves, and represented in Figure 1. That is: 
 
Table A 4. VC 1 and VC 2 in Case 1 (in terms of slopes and intercepts) 
Sub-Cases VC 1 VC 2 
 ܣ ܦ  (slopes)   (y-intercept)  (x-intercept)  
  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0   ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0  
Case 1.1: + +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   n.a.  n.a.  
Case 1.2:  + -  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܥ < െ
ܦ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܤ > െ
ܦ
ܧ  
Case 1.3:  - +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܥ < െ
ܦ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܤ > െ
ܦ
ܧ  
 
If the slope of ߩሶ ൌ 0 is larger than the slope of ߣሶ ൌ 0, and A and D are both positive (Case 1.1) then 
conditions VC1 and VC2 will always hold. If, on the other hand, either A (Case 1.2) or D (Case 1.3) 
are negative, then we need to impose two additional conditions: that the y-intercept of ߩሶ ൌ 0 is smaller 
than the y-intercept of ߣሶ ൌ 0 and that the x-intercept of ߩሶ ൌ 0 is larger than the x-intercept of ߣሶ ൌ 0. 
In each case, the conditions detailed will ensure that the equilibrium values for the non-zero steady 
state are positive. To ensure that they are also less or equal than one, we need to impose in addition 
VC3 and VC4. In terms of the slopes and intercepts of the system these conditions become: 
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Table A 5. VC 3 and VC 4 in Case 1, in terms of slopes and intercepts 
Sub-Cases VC 3 VC 4 
 ܣ ܦ  (slopes)       
  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0   (y-int. diff.)  (slope diff.)  (x-int. diff.)  (slope diff.)  
Case 1.1: + +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   ൬െ
ܦ
ܨ൰ െ ൬െ
ܣ
ܥ൰ ≤ ൬െ
ܤ
ܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰  ൬െ
ܣ
ܤ൰ െ ൬െ
ܦ
ܧ൰ ≤ ൬െ
ܨ
ܧ൰ െ ൬െ
ܥ
ܤ൰  
Case 1.2:  + -  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   ൬െ
ܦ
ܨ൰ െ ൬െ
ܣ
ܥ൰ ≤ ൬െ
ܤ
ܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰  ൬െ
ܣ
ܤ൰ െ ൬െ
ܦ
ܧ൰ ≤ ൬െ
ܨ
ܧ൰ െ ൬െ
ܥ
ܤ൰  
Case 1.3:  - +  െܤܥ > െ
ܧ
ܨ   ൬െ
ܦ
ܨ൰ െ ൬െ
ܣ
ܥ൰ ≤ ൬െ
ܤ
ܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰  ൬െ
ܣ
ܤ൰ െ ൬െ
ܦ
ܧ൰ ≤ ൬െ
ܨ
ܧ൰ െ ൬െ
ܥ
ܤ൰  
 
These conditions basically state that the slope differential should be greater than the intercept 
differentials. Regardless of the sub-case, if the slope differential is sufficiently large then ߩସ∗ and ߣସ∗  
will always be less than one. 
We already know all the conditions needed to get a viable equilibrium under different assumptions on 
A and D for the case in which the slope of ߩሶ ൌ 0 is larger than the slope of ߣሶ ൌ 0. We turn now to 
analyze the second case. 
8.1.2. Case 2: negative denominator in Equilibrium 4 
Following the same procedure than in the previous case, we arrive to these viability conditions: 
 
Table A 6. VC 1 and VC 2 in Case 2, in terms of slopes and intercepts 
Sub-Cases VC 1 VC 2 
 ܣ ܦ  (slopes)   (y-intercept)  (x-intercept)  
  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0   ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0  
Case 2.1: - -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   n.a.  n.a.  
Case 2.2:  + -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܥ > െ
ܦ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܤ < െ
ܦ
ܧ  
Case 2.3:  - +  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܥ > െ
ܦ
ܨ   െ
ܣ
ܤ < െ
ܦ
ܧ  
 
Note that once the sign of the slope differential is changed, the signs of the remaining conditions 
change as well. In addition, it is interesting to mention that, in this case, if the terms A and D are 
simultaneously negative the equilibrium will always deliver positive values for ߩସ∗ and ߣସ∗ , no matter 
the magnitude of A and D. 
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Turning now to analyse VC3 and VC4, we find the same pattern. Now that the sign of the slope 
condition has change, the signs of the remaining conditions change as well: 
 
Table A 7. VC 3 and VC 4 in Case 2, in terms of slopes and intercepts 
Sub-Cases VC 3 VC 4 
 ܣ ܦ  (slopes)       
  ߩሶ=0  ߣሶ=0   (y-int. diff.)  (slope diff.)  (x-int. diff.)  (slope diff.)  
Case 2.1: - -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   ൬െ
ܦ
ܨ൰ െ ൬െ
ܣ
ܥ൰ ≥ ൬െ
ܤ
ܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰  ൬െ
ܣ
ܤ൰ െ ൬െ
ܦ
ܧ൰ ≥ ൬െ
ܨ
ܧ൰ െ ൬െ
ܥ
ܤ൰  
Case 2.2:  + -  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   ൬െ
ܦ
ܨ൰ െ ൬െ
ܣ
ܥ൰ ≥ ൬െ
ܤ
ܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰  ൬െ
ܣ
ܤ൰ െ ൬െ
ܦ
ܧ൰ ≥ ൬െ
ܨ
ܧ൰ െ ൬െ
ܥ
ܤ൰  
Case 2.3:  - +  െܤܥ < െ
ܧ
ܨ   ൬െ
ܦ
ܨ൰ െ ൬െ
ܣ
ܥ൰ ≥ ൬െ
ܤ
ܥ൰ െ ൬െ
ܧ
ܨ൰  ൬െ
ܣ
ܤ൰ െ ൬െ
ܦ
ܧ൰ ≥ ൬െ
ܨ
ܧ൰ െ ൬െ
ܥ
ܤ൰  
 
8.2. Stability properties 
In this appendix we show that under Case 1 Equilibrium 4 will always be stable and that the first, 
second and third equilibrium will be stable in Case 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. 
Before analysing each steady state it is important to recall that in a linear system of two dimensions, 
according to the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, an equilibrium point will be stable if the trace of the 
corresponding Jacobian matrix evaluated in that point is negative and the determinant is positive. That 
is, if: 
 ݐݎሺܬܽܿாሻ ൏ 0  
 ݀݁ݐሺܬܽܿாሻ ൐ 0  
If, instead, both determinant and trace are positive then the equilibrium will be unstable. Finally, if the 
determinant is negative, the equilibrium will be a saddle point regardless of the sign of the trace. 
In our case, the Jacobian of the system formed by equations (26) and (27) is: 
 ܬܽܿ ൌ ൤ܣ ൅ 2ܤߩ ൅ ܥߣ ܥߩܧߣ ܦ ൅ ܧߩ ൅ 2ܨߣ൨  
Hence, the trace and determinant are given by the following expressions: 
 ݐݎሺܬܽܿሻ ൌ ܣ ൅ ܦ ൅ 2ܤߩ ൅ ܧߩ ൅ ܥߣ ൅ 2ܨߣ  
 ݀݁ݐሺܬܽܿሻ ൌ ܥߣሺܦ ൅ 2ܨߣሻ ൅ ܣሺܦ ൅ ܧߩ ൅ 2ܨߣሻ ൅ 2ܤߩሺܦ ൅ ܧߩ ൅ 2ܨߣሻ  
 
 50 
 
Replacing the equilibrium values in the corresponding expressions of the trace and the determinant of 
the Jacobian of the system yields the following results: 
 
Table A 8. Trace and Determinant of the Jacobian for each equilibrium 
Equilibrium Trace Determinant 
ࡱ૚ ܣ ൅ ܦ ܣܦ 
ࡱ૛ െሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻܤ െ ܣ 
ሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻ
ܤ ܣ 
ࡱ૜ െሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻܨ െ ܦ 
ሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ
ܨ ܦ 
ࡱ૝ ܤሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ ൅ ܨሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ  
െሺܣܧ െ ܤܦሻሺܥܦ െ ܣܨሻ
െሺܤܨ െ ܥܧሻ  
 
Now, by looking at the expressions of this table and recalling the conditions that defined each of the 
six sub-cases detailed in the previous appendix, it is possible to determine the sign of the trace and 
determinant and, therefore, the stability properties of each equilibrium in each sub-case. The following 
table summarizes these results. 
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Table A 9. Trace and Determinant signs and stability properties of the Equilibria in each sub-case 
Sub-Cases Equilibria 
 
A D 
Slopes  VC1  VC2   Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4 
 (BF-CE)  (CD-AF)  (AE-BD)   Tr Det Stab  Tr Det Stab  Tr Det Stab  Tr Det Stab 
Case 1.1: + + + 
 
+ 
 
+   + + Unstable  ? - Saddle  ? - Saddle  - + Stable 
Case 1.2:  + - + 
 
+ 
 
+   ? - Saddle  ? - Saddle  + + Unstable  - + Stable 
Case 1.3:  - + + 
 
+ 
 
+   ? - Saddle  + + Unstable  ? - Saddle  - + Stable 
Case 2.1: - - - 
 
- 
 
-   - + Stable  ? - Saddle  ? - Saddle  - - Saddle 
Case 2.2:  + - - 
 
- 
 
-   ? - Saddle  - + Stable  ? - Saddle  - - Saddle 
Case 2.3:  - + - 
 
- 
 
-   ? - Saddle  ? - Saddle  - + Stable  - - Saddle 
 
 
 52 
 
8.3. Comparative statics 
In this appendix we present the partial derivatives of the equilibrium values of ߩସ∗ and ߣସ∗  with respect 
to the deep parameters of the model. In most cases, the sign of these derivatives can be unambiguously 
determined using the conditions established along the paper. For some parameters, however, the 
direction of the effect will depend on some additional conditions. 
In order to simplify the analysis, we express all derivatives in terms of the capital letters A, B, C, D, E 
and F defined in Section 4. This procedure makes much easier the derivation of the corresponding 
signs. As it is shown in Table A 10 the signs of the partial derivatives of each of these terms with 
respect to the deep parameters of the model is almost always unambiguously determined and therefore 
the analysis is significantly reduced. 
Working under the assumption that ߯ ൐ ܽ and ߛ ൏ 1, we already know the signs of four of the six 
terms (ܤ ൏ 0; ܥ ൐ 0; ܧ ൐ 0; ܨ ൏ 0). Moreover, since we are analysing changes in the vicinity of the 
fourth equilibrium, the slope condition should also hold ( ܵ ൌ ܽߠߪ െ ݖߚ߰ ൐ 0 ). Recalling this 
information and making use of the partial derivatives detailed in Table A 10 we turn now to analyse 
the partial effects of changes in each of the deep parameters of the model. 
8.3.1. Marshall-Lerner condition ሺܽሻ 
 ߲ߩସ∗
߲ܽ ൌ
ߩସ∗ฎ
ା
ቀܥ ߲ܧ߲ܽ െ ܤ
߲ܨ
߲ܽቁ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
ିఞఏ௔ାఊሺ௭ఉటିఞఏఙሻழ଴
൅ ቀܥ ߲ܦ߲ܽ െ ܣ
߲ܨ
߲ܽቁ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
?
ณܵ
ା
≷ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲ܽ ൌ
ߣସ∗ฎ
ା
ቀܥ ߲ܧ߲ܽ െ ܤ
߲ܨ
߲ܽቁ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
ିఞఏ௔ାఊሺ௭ఉటିఞఏఙሻழ଴
൅ ቀܣ ߲ܧ߲ܽ െ ܦ
߲ܦ
߲ܽቁ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
?
ณܵ
ା
≷ 0 
The first derivative ሺ߲ߩସ∗ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߩସ∗ ൏ െܥ
ሺ߲ܦ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ െ ܣሺ߲ܨ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ
ܥሺ߲ܧ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ െ ܤሺ߲ܨ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ  
Otherwise, it will be negative. 
The second derivative ሺ߲ߣସ∗ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߣସ∗ ൏ െܣ
ሺ߲ܧ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ െ ܤሺ߲ܦ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ
ܥሺ߲ܧ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ െ ܤሺ߲ܨ ߲ܽ⁄ ሻ  
Otherwise, it will be negative. 
8.3.2. Exogenous rate of currency depreciationሺܾሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ܾ ൌ
ܥฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲ܾ
ฏ
ା
൐ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲ܾ ൌ െ
ܤฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲ܾ
ฏ
ା
൐ 0 
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8.3.3. Technological accumulation in the leading economy ൫ ෠ܶெ௙൯ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ ෠ܶெ௙
ൌ െܨฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܣ
߲ ෠ܶெ௙
ฑ
ି
൏ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲ ෠ܶெ௙
ൌ ܧฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܣ
߲ ෠ܶெ௙
ฑ
ି
൏ 0 
8.3.4. Investment-Output ratio ሺ݇ሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲݇ ൌ
ܥฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲݇
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲݇ ൌ െ
ܤฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲݇
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 
8.3.5. Population growth ሺ݊ሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲݊ ൌ െ
ܨฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܣ
߲݊
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲݊ ൌ
ܧฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܣ
߲݊
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 
8.3.6. World income ൫ መܼ൯ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ መܼ ൌ
ܥฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
൮߲ܦ߲ መܼ
ฏ
ା
൅ ߩସ∗ฎ
ା ߲ܧ
߲ መܼ
ฏ
ା
൲ ൐ 0 ߲ߣସ∗
߲ መܼ ൌ
߲ܧ
߲ መܼ
ฏ
ା
ቆܥฎ
ା
ߣସ∗ฎ
ା
൅ ܣฎ
?
ቇ െ ܤฎ
ି ߲ܦ
߲ መܼ
ฏ
ା
ณܵ
ା
≷ 0 
The second derivative ൫߲ߣସ∗ ߲ መܼ⁄ ൯ will be negative if and only if: 
 ߣସ∗ ൏ ൬െܣܥ൰ ൅
ܤ
ܥ
߲ܦ ߲ መܼ⁄
߲ܧ ߲ መܼ⁄
ᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ି
  
This means that ߣସ∗  should be smaller than the y-intercept of the curve ߩሶ ൌ 0 ቀെ ஺஼ቁ. However, since 
both ߩො ൌ 0 and ߣመ ൌ 0 have positive slope, this can never happen. Therefore, the sign of the derivative 
will always be positive. 
8.3.7. Sensitivity of productivity growth to knowledge accumulation ሺߙሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ߙ ൌ
ߩସ∗ ቀܥ ߲ܧ߲ߙ െ ܤ
߲ܨ
߲ߙቁ ൅ ቀܥ
߲ܦ
߲ߙ െ ܣ
߲ܨ
߲ߙቁ
ܵ
ൌ ݄ߚฏ
ା
ሺܽ െ ߯ሻᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ି
ሺܽߠߪ െ ݖߚ߰ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
൏ 0 
߲ߣସ∗
߲ߙ ൌ
ߣସ∗ ቀܥ ߲ܧ߲ߙ െ ܤ
߲ܨ
߲ߙቁ ൅ ቀܣ
߲ܧ
߲ߙ െ ܦ
߲ܦ
߲ߙቁ
ܵ 	
ൌ ݄ߪฏ
ା
ሺܽ െ ߯ሻᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ି
ሺܽߠߪ െ ݖߚ߰ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
൏ 0 
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8.3.8. Induced innovation coefficient ሺߚሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ߚ ൌ ߩସ
∗ฎ
ା
൬ܧ െ ܤ ߲ܨ߲ߚ൰ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
ሺ௭ట ௚⁄ ሻவ଴
൅ ቌܦฎ
?
െ ܣฎ
? ߲ܨ
߲ߚ
ฏ
ି
ቍ ≷ 0 ߲ߣସ∗߲ߚ ൌ െ
ߣସ∗ฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
൮ܤฎ
ି ߲ܨ
߲ߚ
ฏ
ି
െ ܧฎ
ା ߲ܥ
߲ߚ
ฏ
ା
൲ ൐ 0 
The first derivative ሺ߲ߩସ∗ ߲ߚ⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߩସ∗ ൐ ܦ െ ܣ
ሺ߲ܨ ߲ߚ⁄ ሻ
ܤሺ߲ܨ ߲ߚ⁄ ሻ െ ܧ  
Otherwise, it will be negative. 
8.3.9. Kaldor-Verdoorn Coefficient ሺߛሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ߛ ൌ
ߩସ∗ ቀܥ ߲ܧ߲ߛ െ ܤ
߲ܨ
߲ߛቁ ൅ ቀܥ
߲ܦ
߲ߛ െ ܣ
߲ܨ
߲ߛቁ
ܵ 	
ൌ ݊ߚฏ
ା
ሺܽ െ ߯ሻᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ି
ሺܽߠߪ െ ݖߚ߰ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
൏ 0 
߲ߣସ∗
߲ߛ ൌ
ߣସ∗ ቀܥ ߲ܧ߲ߛ െ ܤ
߲ܨ
߲ߛቁ ൅ ቀܣ
߲ܧ
߲ߛ െ ܦ
߲ܦ
߲ߛቁ
ܵ 	
ൌ ݊ߪฏ
ା
ሺܽ െ ߯ሻᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ି
ሺܽߠߪ െ ݖߚ߰ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
൏ 0 
8.3.10. Domestic investments in R&D ሺߞሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ߞ ൌ
ܥฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲ߞ
ฏ
ା
െ ܨฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܣ
߲ߞ
ฏ
ା
൐ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲ߞ ൌ
ܧฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܣ
߲ߞ
ฏ
ା
െ ܤฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲ߞ
ฏ
ା
൐ 0 
8.3.11. Sensitivity of wage inflation to structural modernization ሺߠሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ߠ ൌ െ
߲ܦ ߲ߠ⁄ᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ି
ณܵ
ା
ቆܣฎ
?
൅ ߩସ∗ฎ
ା
ܤฎ
ି
ቇ ≷ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲ߠ ൌ െߣସ
∗ฎ
ା ܤฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܨ
߲ߠ
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 
The first derivative ሺ߲ߩସ∗ ߲ߠ⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߩସ∗ ൏ െܣܤ  
That is, if ߩସ∗ is lower than the x-intercept of the curve ߩሶ ൌ 0. Once more, since both curves have 
positive slopes, this will never happen. Therefore, the derivative will always be negative. 
8.3.12. Sensitivity of productivity growth to capital intensification ሺߤሻ 
 
߲ߩସ∗
߲ߤ ൌ
ܥฎ
ା
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲ߤ
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 ߲ߣସ
∗
߲ߤ ൌ െ
ܤฎ
ି
ณܵ
ା
߲ܦ
߲ߤ
ฏ
ି
൏ 0 
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8.3.13. Autonomous income elasticity of exportsሺߦሻ 
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8.3.14. Absorptive capacity ሺߪሻ 
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The first derivative ሺ߲ߩସ∗ ߲ߪ⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߩସ∗ ൏ െܥ
ሺ߲ܦ ߲ߪ⁄ ሻ െ ܨ
ܥሺ߲ܦ ߲ߪ⁄ ሻ ൅ ܨ
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
ଵ
  
It follows that the derivative will always be positive unless the domestic economy manages to leap-
frog the leading economy (ߩସ∗ ൐ 1ሻ. 
The second derivative ሺ߲ߣସ∗ ߲ߪ⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߣସ∗ ൏ െ
ሺܧ ൅ ܦሻ݃ െ ߙ൫ ෠ܶெ௙ െ ߞ൯ሺ߯ െ ܽሻ
ܽߠ   
8.3.15. Income-elasticity of imports ሺ߯ሻ 
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8.3.16. Gap punishment on income-elasticity of exports ሺ߰ሻ 
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The first derivative ሺ߲ߩସ∗ ߲߰⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
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 ߩସ∗ ൐ െ߲ܦ ߲߰
⁄
߲ܧ ߲߰⁄
ᇩᇭᇪᇭᇫ
ଵ
  
It follows that the derivative will always be negative unless the domestic economy manages to 
leapfrog the leading economy (ߩସ∗ ൐ 1ሻ. 
The second derivative ሺ߲ߣସ∗ ߲߰⁄ ሻ will be positive if and only if: 
 ߣସ∗ ൐ ൬െܣܥ൰ ൅
ܤ
ܥ
߲ܦ ߲ መܼ⁄
߲ܧ ߲ መܼ⁄
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ିଵ
⇒ ߣସ∗ ൐ െܣ ൅ ܤܥ ⇒ ߣସ
∗ ൐ ݄ െ ߞߚ  
 
This would happen only at very high levels of ߩସ∗  and therefore the sign will most probably be 
negative. 
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Table A 10. Partial derivatives of terms A, B, C, D, E and F with respect to the deep parameters of the model 
Parameter ࣔ࡭ࣔ࢏  
ࣔ࡮
ࣔ࢏  
ࣔ࡯
ࣔ࢏  
ࣔࡰ
ࣔ࢏  
ࣔࡱ
ࣔ࢏  
ࣔࡲ
ࣔ࢏  
ܽ 0  0  0  ሾܾሺ1 ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߤ݇ ൅ ߙሺߞ ൅ ߪሻሿ߯ ൅ ߛሺߦ െ ߰ሻ መܼሾሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ሿଶ ൐ 0 
ߛ߰ መܼ െ ߯ߙߪ
ሾሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ሿଶ ≶ 0 
ሾߙߚ െ ሺ1 ൅ ߛሻߠሿ߯
ሾሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ሿଶ ≶ 0 
ܾ 0  0  0  ܽሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൐ 0  0  0 
෠ܶெ௙ െ1 ൏ 0  0  0  0  0  0 
݇ 0  0  0  െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߤሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0  0  0 
݊ 0  0  0  െ1 ൏ 0  0  0 
መܼ 0  0  0  ሺߦ െ ߰ሻሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൐ 0 
߰
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൐ 0  0 
ߙ 0  0  0  െሺߞ ൅ ߪሻሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0 
ߪሺ߯ െ ܽሻ
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൐ 0  െ
ߚሺ߯ െ ܽሻ
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0 
ߚ 0  0  1 ൐ 0  0  0  െ ߙሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0 
ߛ 0  0  0  െሺ߯ െ ܽሻ൛ܾܽ ൅ ሾߤ݇ ൅ ߙሺߞ ൅ ߪሻሿሺܽ െ ߯ሻ ൅ ሺߦ െ ߰ሻ መܼൟሾሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ሿଶ ൏ 0 
ሺܽ െ ߯ሻൣߙߪሺ߯ െ ܽሻ ൅ ߰ መܼ൧
ሾሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ሿଶ ൐ 0 
ሺ߯ െ ܽሻሾߙߚሺ߯ െ ܽሻ ൅ ܽߠሿ
ሾሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ሿଶ ൐ 0 
ߞ 1 ൐ 0  0  0  െ ߙሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0  0  0 
ߠ 0  0  0  0  0  െ ܽሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0 
ߤ 0  0  0  െ ሺ߯ െ ܽሻ݇ሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0  0  0 
ߦ 0  0  0  መܼሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൐ 0  0  0 
ߪ 1 ൐ 0  1 ൐ 0  0  െ ߙሺ߯ െ ܽሻሺ߯ െ ܽሻߛ ൅ ߯ ൏ 0 
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